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In this paper, we aim to answer two key questions: Does corporate governance quality 
(CGQ) improve stock liquidity in Australia? Does the relationship between CGQ and stock 
liquidity depend on the choice of liquidity proxies/dimensions? This has considerable 
implications for studying stock liquidity since selecting an appropriate proxy for liquidity is 
an important issue in empirical research design (Goyenko et al., 2009; Chai et al., 2010).  
Liquidity has become a world-wide concern, in particular since the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC), and continues to be a prominent area of research in the market 
microstructure literature. Handa and Schwartz (1996) highlight that “Investors want three 
things from the markets: liquidity, liquidity and liquidity” (p. 44). In a perfectly liquid 
market, any amount of a given security can promptly be converted to cash or vice versa at no 
cost. In a less than perfect world, a liquid market is one where the transaction costs associated 
with this conversion are minimal (Harris, 1990). Investors require compensation not only for 
the risks they bear but also for transaction costs they incur when trading their shares (Amihud 
and Mendelson, 1986). Empirical evidence indicates that illiquid stocks have higher flotation 
costs for equity issuance (Butler et al., 2005). All else being equal, therefore, the cost of 
equity is higher for firms with illiquid equity than for firms with more liquid equity (Lipson 
and Mortal, 2009). This suggests that liquidity affects the denominator (the cost of capital) of 
the discounted cash flow model, and thus affects firm value (Fang et al., 2009).  
Given the importance of stock liquidity for both investors and firms, it is imperative to 
understand what determines stock liquidity. Early studies examine the effect of stock 
characteristics (e.g., stock price, return volatility, trading volume, and number of trades) and 
market characteristics (e.g., market structure and competition) on bid-ask spread and other 
liquidity proxies (Tinic, 1972; Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and Freed, 1977). A 
number of prior studies investigate the linkage between external governance and stock 
liquidity by using cross-country variations in regulatory and legal environments (Bacidore 
and Sofianos, 2002; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Chung, 2006; Eleswarapu and 
Venkataraman, 2006). For instance, Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), using the firms listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), find that stock liquidity of the U.S-based firms is 
higher than those based outside the U.S. in terms of  a narrow spread, more depth, and lesser 
transitory volatility. Likewise, Brockman and Chung (2003) use the firms listed on Hong 
Kong stock exchange and report that Hong Kong-based firms have higher liquidity than the 
mainland China-based firms. Similarly, Jain (2003) finds that the bid-ask spread is narrow in 
countries where the protection of shareholder’s rights is strong.  
In contrast to the above studies, we focus on the differences in stock liquidity due to 
internal governance quality. Classical studies emphasize the role of internal governance in 
stock liquidity. For instance, Coffee (1991) suggests that large investors support the decisions 
to improve internal governance mechanisms because such mechanisms enhance stock 
liquidity that in turn makes exit less costly. Despite this argument, the empirical evidence on 
                                                          
1 In the very formative stages of developing this research idea, our thinking was greatly assisted by completing the “pitching template” 




the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and stock liquidity is scant. Chung 
et al. (2010) show that the governance quality improves stock liquidity in the U.S. 
Specifically, they find that better governed firms are associated with narrower spread, smaller 
price impact of trade and lower probability of informed trading. However, these findings are 
limited to short time series (2001 to 2004) and coincide with the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which might have resulted in the spurious correlation between 
governance quality and stock liquidity. In terms of stock liquidity, their findings are based 
only on quote-based and high frequency proxies, and thus are not generalizable to economies 
where such data is unavailable. Moreover, they do not cover the immediacy dimension of 
liquidity, and therefore whether CGQ improves trading frequency dimension of liquidity is 
unexplored. In terms of governance quality, one of the key components of the governance 
index of Chung et al. (2010) is the antitakeover provisions.2 Unlike U.S. firms, Australian 
firms have few antitakeover provisions available to them. For this reason, the analysis of 
antitakeover provisions on stock liquidity has limited applicability in the Australian context. 
These limitations cast a doubt on the generalizability of the results from U.S. firms to 
Australian firms. Foo and Zain (2010) examine the relationship between individual 
governance mechanisms such as board independence, board diligence and stock liquidity in 
the Malaysia. They find that a more independent and diligent board improves stock liquidity. 
However, their study is limited to cross-sectional data (only in 2007), and does not consider 
time-series variation. Recently, Lei et al. (2013) find a positive relationship between 
governance quality and stock liquidity in China during the period 2006 to 2008. Their 
conclusion, however, is based on a short time-series and quote-based proxies of stock 
liquidity. Moreover, their liquidity proxies only consider the trading cost dimension. 
Similarly, Prommin et al. (2014) document that better governance improves stock liquidity 
over time in Thailand. However, this finding does not survive in the cross-sectional setting. 
Since they select only 100 large firms during a short period of time (2006 to 2009), their 
findings cannot be generalized to the wider economy.3 Moreover, they do not consider quote-
based proxies or the trading cost dimension of liquidity. They measure immediacy with one 
proxy and do not show robustness through alternative measures. Therefore, the importance of 
the given issue and the limitations in literature motivate us to closely examine the 
relationship, aiming to overcome these shortcomings and so introduce new insights into this 
literature.  
To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has examined such a relationship by 
using internal governance quality, larger cross-section and longer time series data, and three 
main dimensions of stock liquidity (tightness, price impact and immediacy) that are 
calculated by using both high and low frequency quote, volume and prices based data in one 
paper. Given the importance of stock liquidity and the limited research relating governance 
quality to stock liquidity, our study is the first to contribute to the existing literature by 
providing comprehensive and updated evidence on the linkage between governance quality 
and stock liquidity. 
                                                          
2 Their governance index is based on 24 provisions, 10 of them are related to anti-takeover. 
3 Corporate governance provisions of large firms do not vary much. As can be seen in their summary statistics (Table 2), the governance 
index is 6 in 25th percentile, 7 in 50th percentile, and 8 in 75th percentile. This is the reason that they have not found significant cross-
sectional variation between governance quality and stock liquidity. 
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Corporate governance is assumed to affect stock liquidity through the channel of 
financial transparency and information reporting quality. Specifically, better corporate 
governance imposes more monitoring on managers and, therefore, prevents opportunistic 
managers from concealing and distorting information. Thus, better corporate governance 
improves financial transparency of a firm and mitigates information asymmetry between 
insiders (e.g., managers) and outsiders (e.g., investors), as well as among outsiders. When 
information asymmetry is less severe, traders face less adverse selection problems (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985); hence, they provide more liquidity to stocks of well governed firms.  
By using the large sample of 1,207 Australian firms over the period from 2001 to 2013, 
we find that CGQ is positively associated with stock liquidity. This association is both 
statistically and economically significant. For instance, our results of pooled ordinary least 
square regression reveal that an increase in CGQ by one standard deviation improves time-
weighted quoted spread (TWQS) measure of liquidity by as much as 13.12%. The association 
survives even after controlling for an industry effect, a year effect, and firm characteristics, 
such as firm size, return volatility, asset tangibility, stock price, firm age and growth 
opportunities. We also discover that the improvement in liquidity through governance quality 
is related to all three dimensions of stock liquidity. In addition, we document that the 
relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity is unaffected by the use of high frequency or 
low frequency liquidity proxies, and is also unaffected by the use of price, volume or quote-
based liquidity proxies. Therefore, our findings provide comprehensive insights into the 
governance-liquidity nexus.  
We then perform a variety of robustness checks to ensure that our main results are 
reliable. Specifically, we find that our main findings are robust to alternative estimation 
methods i.e., fixed effect (time-series variation) and between estimators (cross-sectional 
variation) regressions, to different sample specifications i.e., to the GFC, to the balanced part 
of the data, and to the exclusion of either the smallest or the largest 10 % of firms from the 
sample. We also employ regressions based on one, two and three period lagged values of the 
independent variables to mitigate the potential endogeneity bias originating from reverse 
causality. Regressions based on lagged values of CGQ indicate that improvement in prior 
years to CGQ significantly improves current year stock liquidity, confirming the results based 
on contemporaneous variables. To further alleviate concerns for possible endogeneity, we use 
an instrumental variable approach, i.e., fixed effect two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) and 
two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM). The results further confirm that 
better CGQ leads to greater stock liquidity even when we control the possible sources of 
endogeneity.  
In addition to the relationship of composite CGQ with stock liquidity, we examine the 
relationship of each governance category i.e., board quality (Independent directors, 
independent chairman, and board meetings) audit committee (presence, independence, size, 
and meetings), nomination committee (presence and independence), and remuneration 
committee (presence and independence) with stock liquidity. We find that liquidity is not 
driven by a narrow group of governance provisions. Finally, we address omitted variable bias 
(in addition to the fixed effects regression) by including ownership concentration variables in 
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the model. Since ownership concentration may affect both CGQ and stock liquidity, we 
investigate the sensitivity of our main results to the inclusion of ownership concentration in 
the model. We find that even if we control ownership concentration, the relationship between 
CGQ and stock liquidity survives. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways, including context, data and methodology. 
First, to the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first study to show that a composite 
internal CGQ score is relevant to stock liquidity in the Australian context. Australia possesses 
several regulatory and institutional differences that make it a distinctive venue in which to 
investigate this relation. In particular, compared to the U.S., Australia has a different trading 
mechanism (pure order-driven); intensive disclosure requirements (signal G); a voluntary and 
less stringent governance environment (comply or explain); a weak “market for control” (a 
lack of threat of takeover); a high ownership concentration, and a low litigation risk. We 
assume that all of these institutional differences have a considerable bearing on governance 
quality and stock liquidity. Though prior literature in Australia indicates that corporate 
governance improves informativeness of disclosure (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 
2014)4, and that disclosure quality reduces information asymmetries (Chang et al., 2008)5, 
there is no evidence on the direct linkage between corporate governance and stock liquidity in 
Australia. 
Second, prior literature on corporate governance and stock liquidity either uses high 
frequency or low frequency proxies of stock liquidity.6 We extend literature by incorporating 
both high frequency (i.e., time-weighted quoted spread) and low frequency (e.g., Amihud 
illiquidity estimate, liquidity ratio and turnover) stock liquidity proxies in a single study. The 
high frequency liquidity proxies require, for their calculation, microstructure data on 
transactions and quotes that are not available in most markets around the world for long time 
periods. In contrast, low frequency liquidity proxies are calculated from daily data on returns 
and volume that are readily available for most markets over long periods of time (Amihud, 
2002). Therefore, it is important to incorporate low frequency liquidity proxies for the 
generalizability of results to those markets where high frequency data is not easily available. 
In addition to this, prior studies on corporate governance and stock liquidity include one or 
two dimensions of stock liquidity.7 We extend the literature by incorporating liquidity 
proxies that capture three dimensions of the liquidity; namely, trading cost, price impact of 
trade, and immediacy in a single study. It helps us to know if corporate governance has a 
differential effect on various dimensions of stock liquidity. Finally, based on the type of data, 
Lesmond (2005) classifies liquidity proxies into three categories: price-based, volume-based 
and quote-based. Each liquidity proxy has its weaknesses and strengths. Prior literature on 
CGQ and stock liquidity does not cover all.8 However, our liquidity proxies in this paper 
cover all three categories.  
                                                          
4 The effect of CGQ on disclosure has also been examined outside Australia such as in Canada (Bujaki and McConomy, 2002), Hong Kong 
(Chen and Jaggi, 2001), U.S. (Kelton and Yang, 2008) and Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
5 The effect of disclosure on information asymmetry has also been examined outside Australia such as in U.S. (Welker, 1995; Brown and 
Hillegeist, 2007; Balakrishnan et al., 2014), and Italy (Frino et al., 2013). 
6 For example, Chung et al. (2010) and Lei et al. (2013) use high frequency proxies; Prommin et al. (2014) use low frequency proxies. 
7 For instance, Lei et al. (2013)  include only trading cost; Chung et al. (2010) include trading cost and price impact. However, Prommin et 
al. (2014) include price impact and immediacy. 
8 Chung et al. (2010) and Lei et al. (2013) cover only quote-based proxies; Prommin et al. (2014) cover price- and volume-based proxies. 
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Third, most of the studies on corporate governance and liquidity suffer from either small 
cross section or short time series.9 However, our study covers a large panel dataset, i.e., large 
cross-section (1,217 unique firms) and long-time series (2001 to 2013). Investigating the 
governance–liquidity linkage in Australia in such a period is important because of two major 
events. The first, the introduction of the Australian Securities Exchange corporate governance 
reforms (hereafter ASX CG reforms) in 2003, enables access to data both pre- and post-CG 
reforms; the second, the GFC in 2008. This is the first study that uses the entire universe of 
Australian governance data from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
(SIRCA) database. The sample firms come from all non-financial industries, ages, and are 
heterogeneous in size and profitability. Therefore, the extended dataset allows us not only to 
generalize results to the wider economy (small, medium, and large firms) but also helps us to 
investigate the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity in both time series (within firm) 
and cross sectional (between firms) setting separately. 
Fourth, to capture internal governance quality we follow the Horwath report, which is 
comprehensive and well recognized in the research community. This report pays special 
attention to the aspects that have been viewed as important in CG best practice codes in 
Australia and elsewhere (e.g., IFSA Australia, 1999; ASX CG reforms, 2003; OECD Report, 
1999; US Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; UK Hampel Committee, 1998; Ramsay Report, 
2001). Prior studies that use the Horwath report as a measure of CGQ either are cross-
sectional or have linked CGQ to corporate activities other than stock liquidity, such as firm 
performance (Linden and Matolcsy, 2004), information disclosure (Beekes and Brown, 2006; 
Beekes et al., 2014), and corporate social responsibility (Chan et al., 2014). Given some 
limitations of the Horwath report (see Section 4.2), we construct a new CG index that makes 
several contributions. First, our CG index simplifies the Horwath report by excluding the 
subjective criteria and by using the equally weighted scoring methodology.10  Second, our 
CG index extends the Horwath report to both cross-sectional (including small- and mid-cap 
firms) and time series (including 2008 to 2013). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the 
institutional setting. Section 2 presents the literature review that leads to the hypothesis 
development. Section 3 describes the data, variables and econometric methods, and provides 
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the multivariate regression results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional setting 
2.1. ASX trading system  
If trading mechanisms are placed on a continuum, quote-driven and pure order-driven 
markets would be placed at opposite extremes. In quote-driven markets, designated market 
makers provide liquidity to the market by continuously quoting the bid-ask prices. In order-
driven systems, public limit orders supply liquidity to the market and establish bid-ask prices. 
Most of the markets at the quote-driven end of the spectrum operate hybrid quote-driven 
                                                          
9 For example, Chung et al. (2010) cover 2001 to 2004 (4 years) and 9078 observations in U.S.; Prommin et al. (2014) cover 2006 to 2009 
(4 years) and 400 observations in Thailand; Lei et al. (2013) cover 2006 to 2008 (3 years) and 3923 observations; Foo and Zain (2010) cover 
2007 (1 year) and 481 observations. 
10 Such methodology has been used by extant corporate governance literature (see e.g., Gompers et al., 2003). 
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systems (e.g., NYSE and NASDAQ), where public limit orders compete with the prices 
offered by market makers.  
The ASX is a pure order-driven market. It uses a fully automated system known as the 
Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS) that matches orders based on the 
concept of “priority” trading. The orders are ranked in priority of prices and then in time 
within price. Under SEATS, there are no designated market makers, so public limit orders 
provide liquidity. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in the limited order book 
market structures due to an improvement in information technology and deregulation in 
financial markets. This trading system provides a more transparent environment of trading to 
market participants, since they can observe recent trades. The substantial literature that has 
compared liquidity levels across differing stock exchange mechanisms indicates that liquidity 
tends to be greater on exchanges that allow limit orders. For instance, Brown and Zhang 
(1997) argue that in markets which allow limit orders, execution-price risk is low and level of 
liquidity is high. The empirical question here is to investigate if the high level of liquidity in 
order driven markets, such as Australia, can be explained through the CGQ. By considering 
the relationship between liquidity and governance quality on the ASX, this paper helps fill 
the research gap with respect to order-driven stock markets. 
2.2. Corporate governance in Australia 
The findings from other countries, particularly U.S. may not directly apply to the Australian 
market because of different corporate environment–voluntary governance mechanisms, weak 
market for control, high ownership concentration and low litigation risk–that have a 
significant influence on the internal governance practices of firms.  
The wave of corporate collapses in the early 2000s in several sectors of Australia, such 
as telecommunication (e.g., OneTel), insurance (e.g., HIH), retail (e.g., Harris Scarfe) and 
mining and exploration (e.g., Centaur) prompted major CG reforms. The first major review of 
CG in Australia for some time was The Royal Commission Report on the bankruptcy event 
of HIH.  This report’s recommendations aimed not to trigger wholesale legislative change but 
to review the processes of management. The second and most comprehensive review of the 
internal governance mechanisms of listed Australian companies, the “Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations”, was introduced by ASX CG 
Council in March 2003.11 The review proposes ten principles and contains 28 
recommendations applicable to the CG practices of listed companies in Australia. The ASX 
listing rule 4.10.3 [formerly ASX listing rule 3c (3) (i)] requires listed companies to disclose 
their compliance with the ASX CG reforms in their annual report beginning with the first 
financial reporting year after 1 January 2003. If a company does not comply with any of the 
ASX CG reforms, it is required to disclose the reason for non-compliance. This “if not, why 
not” suggests that the CG environment in Australian is less stringent than that of the U.S. 
Therefore, a higher degree of cross sectional variation is expected in the CGQ of Australian 
firms that may influence stock liquidity differently. 
                                                          
11 Brown et al. (2011) state that “it is worth noting that, on this view, CG is confined to matters that are, or ought to be, within the control of 
the shareholders and the board. Perhaps that explains why authoritative ‘principles’ statements typically deal with matters which the 
shareholders and the board can decide and implement” (p. 99). That is, governance codes of conduct focus on internal governance 
mechanisms and ignore the external governance matters. 
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Prior research suggests that there is an interplay between external (takeover market) and 
internal (board of directors) governance mechanisms (John and Senbet, 1998). In particular, 
there is a substitution effect between the internal mechanisms for managerial control (e.g., 
board quality) and external mechanisms for control (e.g., the takeover market). Williamson 
(1983) suggests a Substitute Hypothesis, which claims that the importance of the board as 
corporate control mechanism is greater in firms operating in markets where takeovers are 
difficult and vice versa. Compared to the U.S., the market for corporate control in Australia 
as a mechanism for disciplining poorly performing managers is weak that makes the role of 
internal governance mechanisms more important in Australia (Pham et al., 2011). 
Ownership concentration has a strong influence on corporate governance practices of the 
firms. According to La Porta et al. (1998), differences in the legal environment may assist in 
explaining why in different countries the firms are owned and financed differently. The 
researchers find an inverse relationship between the quality of the legal protection of 
investors and the ownership concentration. Denis and McConnell (2003) find more 
concentrated ownership in the non-U.S. countries than in the U.S. By using a sample of 49 
countries, La Porta et al. (1998) report that ownership concentration is much higher in 
Australia than in the U.S. Since ownership concentration permits close monitoring of the 
firm’s management, it may reduce the demand for alternative monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
proportion of independent directors, separation of CEO from board chair, and audit 
committee). To the extent that ownership structure influences corporate governance practices, 
the latter is likely to differ between the U.S. and Australia.  
Unlike the legal environment of the U.S., which is uniquely hospitable to litigation 
against directors, the legal environment of Australia discourages securities lawsuits. This 
implies that litigation risk is lower in Australia than it is in the U.S. (Monem, 2013). To the 
extent that financial and legal systems lead to disparities in CG systems, differences in the 
corporate legal environment of Australia and the U.S. suggests differences in the corporate 
governance practices of the two countries (Monem, 2013). Given the different corporate 
governance setting, it is imperative to investigate the governance-liquidity nexus for 
Australian firms. 
3. Related literature and hypothesis development 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation raises an information 
asymmetry problem between managers and investors; i.e., the managers have information 
that investors do not have (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such information asymmetry creates 
a moral hazard problem where managers, at the expense of outsiders, have an incentive to 
pursue their own interests and transfer a firm’s wealth to themselves (Switzer and Wang, 
2013). Self-interested and opportunistic managerial behaviour can include shirking 
responsibility, overcompensation, consumption of perquisites and empire building. In order 
to mask their wealth expropriation, opportunistic managers may opt to disclose selected 
favourable information, resulting in more information asymmetry. 
CG mechanisms may improve financial transparency of a firm by mitigating an ability 
and incentive of a management to distort information disclosure (Leuz et al., 2003). The CG 
mechanisms make it more likely that self-interested managers fully disclose relevant and 
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reliable information to shareholders. For instance, Beekes and Brown (2006) and Beekes et 
al. (2014) show that better governed firms have more price sensitive disclosures, have a 
larger analyst following, have more accurate and less biased analyst consensus forecasts, and 
have more timely disclosure of value-relevant information. Better governance quality, 
therefore, should be associated with lower information asymmetry. 
Empirical studies have shown that well-regarded disclosure policy reduces information 
asymmetries between management and traders (Welker, 1995; Chang et al., 2008). The 
reduced information asymmetry diminishes the trader’s incentive for private information 
search which not only leads to less heterogeneity among traders beliefs but also to the smaller 
speculative positions among informed traders (Diamond, 1985). This reduces adverse 
selection costs for the traders. Facing less adverse selection problems, traders may provide 
more liquidity (i.e., narrow spread and lower price impacts of trade) for stocks of well-
governed firms (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). In this study, therefore, we assume that better 
CGQ improves stock liquidity because better CGQ improves financial transparency, which 
mitigates information asymmetry between managers and investors, as well as among 
investors. The hypothesis is as follows; 
Hypothesis 1a: Better CGQ improves stock liquidity.  
Stock liquidity is considered a “slippery and elusive concept” (Kyle, 1985: p. 1316) for a 
number of transactional properties of the market that includes tightness (trading cost), depth 
(price impact) and resiliency. Tightness represents the cost of turning around a position over 
a short period of time. Depth refers to the ability of the market to absorb a large quantity of 
trade without having a large price impact. Resiliency is the speed with which the prices return 
to equilibrium after a large trade.12 Black (1971) suggests another stock liquidity dimension, 
immediacy, which represents the trading speed, i.e., the speed with which buy or sell orders 
can be executed. Prior stock liquidity research normally does not rely on one single measure 
of stock liquidity because each measure proxy different dimensions and has its own 
limitations (Goyenko et al., 2009). The literature on governance quality so far does not pay 
attention to the selection of liquidity proxy as a critical part. It is possible that governance 
quality is related to a limited dimension of liquidity but not to all.  
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity may vary based on the 
liquidity dimensions (tightness, price impact and immediacy). 
The proportion of independent directors is one of the key features of a board structure. 
The ASX CG Council (2003), in Principle 2.1, recommends firms have a higher proportion of 
non-executive independent directors. From an agency perspective, it is argued that 
independent directors are more effective in monitoring and controlling opportunistic 
behaviour of management, and in reducing agency problems (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Furthermore, it is also expected that independent directors are more influential due to 
their capital reputation, experience and the ability to share and provide information and ideas 
from outside (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Chen and Jaggi (2001) find that the proportion of 
independent directors is positively related to comprehensiveness of financial disclosure. 
                                                          
12 Chai et al. (2010) find that the return reversal effect is small in the Australian market due to the absence of dealers. Therefore, we do not 
test this dimension of stock liquidity in our study. 
9 
 
Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) show that an independent board enhances the frequency and 
quality of earnings forecasts by effective monitoring of management.  
CEO duality, another important aspect of the board structure, has received much 
attention by researchers and regulators. The ASX CG Council (2003) recommends that firms 
separate the roles of CEO and chair of the board (see Principle 2.3), and that an independent 
director should chair the board (see Principle 2.2). It is argued that independence of the 
chairman enhances monitoring quality and thus reduces the advantages gained by 
withholding information, thereby improving the disclosure quality. Consistent with this 
argument, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find more disclosure in firms with an independent 
chairman.  
The ASX CG Council (2003) states, in Principle 2, that a firm should have a committed 
board that adequately discharges its responsibilities and duties. Since board diligence or 
commitment is not directly observable, the prior literature relies on the frequency of board 
meetings (i.e., the number of times the board meets in a year) as a proxy of board diligence 
(Kent and Stewart, 2008). With more frequent board meetings, the board is likely to have 
richer information about the firm’s operating environment. This improves the board’s ability 
to effectively exercise its monitoring role (Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007) in mitigating an 
ability and incentive of a management to distort information disclosure.  Foo and Zain (2010) 
find that board independence and board meetings improve stock liquidity. However, these 
findings are limited to only cross sectional data. Based on the above reasoning and empirical 
findings, we develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1c: Board quality, i.e., independent directors, independent chairman and board 
diligence, improves stock liquidity. 
The ASX CG Council (2003) in Principles 2.4, 4.2, and 9.2, recommend that firms 
establish board sub-committees: audit, nomination, and remuneration. Harrison (1987) argues 
that the specific responsibilities of these committees may assist in remedying any poor 
attendance of the directors. Upadhyay et al. (2014) show that the board committees improve 
the observability of the performance of individual directors and also reduce coordination and 
communication problems. The role of the audit committee has received the most attention 
from researchers. It is regarded as an important internal control mechanism that assists in the 
reduction of information asymmetry between shareholders and management (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). Its interaction with external auditors assists the board to ensure that the 
financial statements represent a true and fair view of the firm’s financial condition (Platt and 
Platt, 2012). The ASX CG council (2003) also recommend that the audit committee (1) 
should have at least three members, all of whom are non-executive directors and a majority of 
whom are independent directors and (2) is chaired by an independent director, who is not the 
chair of the board.  Klein (2002) argues that an audit committee composed of independent 
directors improves board effectiveness in monitoring management. Foo and Zain (2010) 
document a positive relationship between audit committee independence and stock liquidity. 
They recommend that future studies may consider other factors of corporate governance such 
as characteristics of audit committee, remuneration and the existence of other committees. 
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Overall, this evidence suggests that the existence and quality of board sub-committees play 
an effective monitoring role and are thus likely to improve informational efficiency, and thus 
improve stock liquidity. 
Hypothesis 1d: The presence and quality of board sub-committees improves stock liquidity. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Sample and data 
The initial sample of 13,500 firm-years consists of the all Australian listed firms whose CG 
data is available in the SIRCA during the period from 2001 to 2013. The sample period is 
important since it includes the ASX CG reforms of 2003 and the GFC of 2008. Consistent 
with the literature, we exclude financial firms because of their unique financial characteristics 
(e.g., composition of financial statements; substantially higher debt ratios) and operating 
environment. The financial information about the sample firms, obtained from the 
Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database, is complemented by the firms’ annual reports, 
which are available in Connect4. The data for the calculation of stock liquidity such as stock 
price and trading volume is obtained from SIRCA. The inclusion of each firm-year 
observation in the sample is conditioned on the availability of the following: (1) governance 
data; (2) financial data; and (3) liquidity data. The final sample comprises 10,179 
observations on 1,207 non-financial firms across all size groups (small, medium, and large). 
To eliminate undue influence of extreme values in the data, which is possibly due to spurious 
outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
4.2. Measures of corporate governance 
To capture the CG standing for each of the considered firms, we construct a CG index by 
following the Horwath report. Unlike the well-renowned U.S.-based Gompers et al. (2003) 
governance index (i.e., G-index), which focuses on the resistance of firms to external control 
mechanisms, the Horwath report places emphasis upon the quality of a firm’s internal 
structures and processes. This is because, compared to the U.S., the market for corporate 
control in Australia as a mechanism for disciplining poorly performing managers is not high, 
which makes the role of internal CG mechanisms more important (Pham et al., 2011). The 
Horwath report provides composite ratings that are based on six categories; namely, (1) board 
structure, (2) audit committee, (3) nomination committee, (4) remuneration committee, (5) 
external auditor independence, and (6) codes of conduct and other policy disclosures (see 
appendix A: Horwath Corporate governance report, 2008).13 
Multiple aspects may limit the generalizability of the findings obtained through the 
Horwath report. First, the Horwath report includes the top 250 firms each year, thus, the 
findings may not be generalizable to medium and small firms. Second, the Horwath report is 
available up to 2008; therefore, the findings do not take into consideration the more recent 
market developments, particularly after the GFC. Third, full details of the Horwath rating 
system are proprietary and confidential, so we are unable to make any comments on the 
                                                          
13 Categories 1-4 are based on objective criteria and categories 5-6 are based on subjective criteria. 
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assignment of ranking and stars beyond the information given in the reports. In addition, two 
of the six categories in the Horwath report are subjective. This may limit the implications of 
our findings for the investors because they may not be able to replicate entire Horwath 
ratings. Fourth, the Horwath report does not provide the category score/rating, so an 
important question is unexplored i.e., which governance category really influences stock 
liquidity? 
We address these issues by collecting an extended CG dataset across both cross-section 
(small, medium, and large firms) and time-series (2001–2013) on the objective Horwath 
categories. These categories are based on 17 criteria. We assign the value 1 if a firm meets 
the particular criteria and 0 otherwise. For instance, if the majority of directors in a firm are 
independent we assign 1, and otherwise 0. These individual values are then aggregated to 
construct a composite CG index, which ranges from 0 to 17 where 0 indicates the “worst” 
governance and 17 indicates the “best” governance. Each governance category is the 
aggregate of the respective individual criteria (see appendix B: Simplified corporate 
governance index). 
 
4.3. Measures of stock liquidity  
The dependent variable is stock liquidity. We employ nine measures of stock liquidity, which 
cover three dimensions: trading cost, price impact and immediacy. Time-weighted quoted 
spread (TWQS) and zero return measure (ZERO) capture trading cost. Amihud illiquidity 
estimate (ILLIQ) and liquidity ratio (LR) capture price impact of trade. Stock turnover 
(TURNOVER), turnover-adjusted number of zero daily volumes (LM), number of trades 
(TRADES), number of levels (LEVELS), and trading volume (VOLUME) capture 
immediacy or trading speed. In untabulated analysis, we carry out a factor analysis (with 
Varimax rotation) and then extract one common factor from our nine measures of stock 
liquidity. Inferences remain the same when the common stock liquidity factor is employed to 
proxy for stock liquidity in our empirical analysis. 
4.3.1. Tightness or trading cost 
4.3.1.1. Time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS) 
Quoted spread is the implicit trading cost for market orders when a trade occurs at the quoted 
price with no price improvement. It is considered a direct measure of transaction cost in the 
prior literature. In periods of heightened information asymmetry, the bid-ask spread is wide 
because, in such periods, uninformed traders change their orders away from the market and 
decrease their chances of trading with informed traders. We follow Aitken and Frino (1996) 
and Chang et al. (2008) in measuring the time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS)14 as a daily 
ratio of the time-weighted bid-ask spread divided by the time-weighted mid-point spread 
averaged over a number of trading days in the financial year. The higher the TWQS, the 
lower is the stock liquidity. 
                                                          
14 The Time-weighted quoted spread estimates the equilibrium spread and mitigates the measurement error pertaining to any spurious 









𝑑=1                            (1) 
where 𝑇𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑖𝑦𝑑  is the time-weighted bid ask spread of firm i on day d of year 
y,   𝑇𝑊𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑦𝑑 is the time-weighted mid-point price of firm i on day d of year y, 
𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of days with available data for firm i in year y. 
The Time-weighted bid ask spread is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑖𝑦𝑑 =
(𝐴𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑖𝑑) × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1+(𝐴𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑖𝑑) × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2+⋯+(𝐴𝑠𝑘−𝐵𝑖𝑑) × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2+⋯+𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛
                            (2) 
The Time-weighted mid-point price is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑊𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑦𝑑 =
(𝐴𝑠𝑘+𝐵𝑖𝑑)
2  × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1+
(𝐴𝑠𝑘+𝐵𝑖𝑑)
2  × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2+⋯+
(𝐴𝑠𝑘+𝐵𝑖𝑑)
2  × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒1+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒2+⋯+𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛
                            (3) 
𝐴𝑠𝑘 = best available ask on the limit order book 
𝐵𝑖𝑑 = best available bid on the limit order book 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛= represents the time period that the bid ask spread remained in existence. 
 
4.3.1.2. Zero return measure (ZERO) 
The proportion of zero daily returns observed over the relevant year is introduced by 
Lesmond et al. (1999) and is calculated as 
𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑍𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡
           (4) 
where 𝑍𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the number of zero return days for firm i in year t, and 𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the number of 
trading days for firm i in year t. 
Zero return days occur when the transaction cost threshold does not exceed for the 
marginal traders who may be either informed or uninformed (Lesmond et al., 1999). When 
the information is not sufficient to compensate the transaction cost, the informed traders are 
likely to minimize their desired trades, or they may choose not to trade. Hence, price will 
remain unchanged. On the other hand, the liquidity traders may choose not to trade when 
there is low liquidity and high transaction cost. As a consequence, there will be no price 
movement from the previous day. Lesmond et al. (1999) show that the zero return measure is 
positively related with spread measures, which is consistent with the transaction cost effect 
on stock returns. The higher the ZERO, the lower is the stock liquidity. 
4.3.2. Price impact of trade 
4.3.2.1. Amihud illiquidity estimate (ILLIQ) 
Given the non-availability of intraday data, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity (ILLIQ), a low 
frequency proxy, is used to measure the daily price impact of the order flow—the premium 
that a buyer pays or the discount that a seller concedes when executing a market order—that 
results from inventory and adverse selection costs. Prior studies such as Huang and Stoll 
(1996) on informed trading claim that price impact of trade captures information asymmetry 
as trade conveys private information. A large trade may attract other traders because there is a 
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possibility that trade is information motivated. For example, a large sale may signal bad news 
while a large purchase may signal good news. A number of empirical studies show that 
ILLIQ is a reliable measure of price impact (Hasbrouck, 2009) and stock liquidity (Lesmond, 
2005; Goyenko et al., 2009; Karolyi et al., 2012). It is measured as the daily ratio of absolute 
stock return to trading volume in Australian dollars averaged over a number of trading days 
in the financial year, i.e., how much absolute stock price changes with one dollar of trading 
volume. The higher the ILLIQ, the lower is the stock liquidity. 







𝑑=1          (5) 
where |𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑦| is the absolute stock return of firm i on day d of year y,  𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑦 is the trading 
volume of firm i on day d of year y, and 𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of days with available data for 
firm i in year y. 
4.3.2.2 Liquidity ratio (LR) 
Liquidity ratio, also known as the Amivest measure of stock liquidity, captures how much 
trading volume is associated with the per unit change in share price. Several previous studies 
have used liquidity ratio as a proxy of stock liquidity (e.g., Amihud et al., 1997; Berkman and 
Eleswarapu, 1998). This captures the idea that markets characterised by resiliency, breadth 
and depth are more liquid and are thus better able to absorb a large trading volume without a 
substantial price change (Kluger and Stephan, 1997). Therefore, the higher the LR, the higher 
is the depth or stock liquidity. We measure the liquidity ratio as the sum of daily trading 
volume divided by the sum of daily absolute stock return in a financial year. 







          (6) 
where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑑𝑦 is the daily trading volume of firm i on day d of year y,  |𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑦| is the absolute 
daily stock returns of firm i on day d of year y, and 𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of days with available 
data for firm i in year y.  
4.3.3. Immediacy 
4.3.3.1 Stock turnover (TURNOVER) 
Turnover captures trading frequency i.e. how many times a share changes owners. Bartov and 
Bodnar (1996) find a relation between information asymmetry and trading volume. They 
explain that information asymmetry may cause a reduction in the trading volume because 
uninformed traders may reduce their trades in such shares. Similarly, Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) claim that shares with high trading volume have low level of information asymmetry 
since prices reveal information. Datar et al. (1998) uses turnover as a proxy of stock liquidity 
and find a significant role of stock liquidity in explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
stock returns. We measure turnover as the sum of daily shares traded in year to the number of 
shares outstanding. The higher the TURNOVER, the higher is the stock liquidity. 
𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑦 =  
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑦
𝑁𝑖𝑦
           (7) 
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where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑦 is the total number of shares traded for firm 𝑖 in an year 𝑦, and 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the 
number of outstanding shares  for firm 𝑖 in an year 𝑦. Volume data for each firm is collected 
on a daily basis, while a number of outstanding shares data is collected on a yearly basis. 
4.3.3.2 Turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) 
Liu (2006) proposes turnover-adjusted zero daily volume (LM) as a new measure of stock 
liquidity. Although LM places a particular focus on trading speed, it captures multiple 
dimensions of liquidity. It is measured as 





                        (8) 
where 𝑁𝑜𝑍𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the number of zero daily trading volumes for firm i in year t; 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is 
the stock turnover for firm i in year t obtained from Eq. (7); 𝑁𝑜𝑇𝐷𝑡 is the total number of 
trading days in year t; and the deflator is set to 480,000 as suggested in Liu (2006). 
Multiplication by the factor 252
𝑁𝑜𝑇𝐷𝑡
 standardizes the number of trading days in a year to 252 
and therefore, makes LM comparable over time. 
The NoZV component of LM is an indicator of illiquidity–the higher the number of days 
with zero trading volume, the less frequent the trade and, therefore, the less liquid the stock. 
It reflects the trade continuity and potential delay in trade execution (Liu, 2006). NoZV is 
similar to the number of zero daily returns; therefore, LM also reflects the trading cost 
dimension of stock liquidity. The turnover component of LM captures the notion of how 
much quantity has been traded, and it acts as a tiebreaker when two stocks have the same 
NoZV. Therefore, LM classifies stock as most liquid if it is traded frequently and has large 
turnover over the relevant year. The higher the LM, the lower is the stock liquidity. 
4.3.3.3. Other immediacy proxies  
Apart from the trading turnover and turnover adjusted zero volume days, we also measure 
immediacy or trading speed through number of trades (TRADES), number of levels 
(LEVELS), and trading volume (VOLUME) (Chordia, Roll, et al., 2001; Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, et al., 2001). The TRADES is measured as the average number of 
transactions during the year. The LEVELS is measured as the yearly average of the number of 
price levels available at a particular time in the order book. It is also referred to as the depth 
of the order book. The VOLUME is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
shares traded (in dollars) during the year. The higher the TRADES, LEVELS and VOLUME, 
the higher is the stock liquidity. 
4.4. Control variables 
To isolate the effect of CGQ on stock liquidity, we include a number of control variables that 
have been found to influence stock liquidity in the prior empirical studies (Chung et al., 
2010; Prommin et al., 2014). They are firm size, share price, return volatility, asset 
tangibility, firm age, leverage, growth opportunities, year effect, and industry effect. We 
control firm size because larger firms have more information available as they may attract 
much more research on their stocks and thus have less adverse selection risk (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). The proxy for firm size is market capitalization (MC), which is calculated 
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as the number of shares outstanding times share price at the end of a fiscal year. To 
accurately capture the effect of tick-size-induced binding constraints, instead of share price; 
we use the reciprocal of share price (1/PRICE). Return volatility (VOLATILITY) increases 
the uncertainty of the cost of holding stock, and thus more volatile stocks have wider bid-ask 
spread and more information asymmetry (Ho and Stoll, 1981). We measure return volatility 
as the standard deviation of daily stock returns. We also control asset tangibility 
(TANGIBILITY) because the payoffs of tangible assets are easy to observe, and this results 
in low information asymmetry. The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets 
is used as a proxy of asset tangibility. In addition to this, we control firm age and leverage. 
Firm age (AGE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm's 
listing, and leverage (LEV) is calculated as the book value of total liabilities over book value 
of total assets. Since firms in the same industry are relatively homogeneous (Alford, 1992), 
we use industry membership (IND) to identify firms with similar accounting methods, 
growth, and risk. To capture possible variation across industries, we include nine separate 
dummy variables for Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Health Care, 
Industrials, Information Technology, Materials, Telecommunication Services and Utilities.15 
Finally, to capture possible variation over time, we include year effect (YR) in the model. 
4.5. Empirical models and estimation methods 
4.5.1. Empirical model 
To test the H1a that is better CGQ improves stock liquidity, and H1b that is the relationship 
between CGQ and stock liquidity may vary based on the liquidity dimensions (trading cost, 
price impact, immediacy), we formulate the following regression equation; 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 +
𝛽6 ln(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (9) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 +
𝛽6 ln(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (10) 
 
𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6 ln(𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (11) 
 
Where the subscripts 𝑖 denotes individual firms (𝑖 = 1,2,…,1207), 𝑡 time period (t = 2001 
2002,…,2013), 𝐿𝑛 natural logarithms. α,𝛽, δ, and ∅ are parameters to be estimated. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term. The definition and details of the variables in Equation 9 are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
4.5.2. Estimation methods 
                                                          
15 We use Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
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First, we employ ordinary least square (OLS) to test the time-series and cross-sectional 
variation in the association of CGQ with stock liquidity. The standard errors are clustered by 
firm to control for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation in the residuals (Petersen, 
2009).Unlike the study of Chung et al. (2010), we also include the  year and industry effects 
to capture the variation over time and across industries, respectively. Second, we use fixed 
effect (FE) regression as an alternative estimation method to investigate the within-variation 
over time (time series variation) and to cope with unobserved firm fixed effect. To choose 
between random effect and fixed effect, we perform the Hausman test. The untabulated 
results confirm the appropriateness of fixed effect. Third, we separately investigate the cross-
sectional variation by employing between estimators (BE) regression. Fourth, we address the 
potential endogeneity concerns by using lagged independent variables, instrumental variable 
approach, i.e., FE-2SLS, and dynamic panel data estimation technique, i.e., two-step system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
4.6. Description statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the CGQ, stock liquidity, and firm 
characteristics in panel A, B, and C respectively. On average, CGQ of the sample firms is 
8.456 with a minimum score of 1 and maximum score of 17. In terms of stock liquidity 
proxies, the sample mean of TWQS is 0.054, ZERO is 0.40, ILLIQ is 7.804, LR is 32.49, 
TURNOVER is 0.478, LM is 4.077, # TRADES is 148.69, # LEVELS is 18.772 and 
Ln(VOL) is 17.666. In terms of firm characteristics, the sample firms have average market 
capitalization of AUD $1,000 million. On average, the sample firms carry 35.5% debt (LEV) 
in their capital structure. Return volatility (VOLATILITY) and asset tangibility 
(TANGIBILITY) average 0.038 and 0.220 respectively. On average, the sample firms are 
13.73 years old, have an inverse share price (PRICE) of 8.406 and growth opportunities 
(MTB) of 2.479. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.6.1. Industry-wise CGQ and liquidity 
Acknowledging the unique composition of the Australian industry sectors, we display the 
sample distribution, CGQ and stock liquidity by sector using GICS in Table 3(a). The highest 
number of observations is from Materials (32%), followed by Industrials (16%), Consumer 
Discretionary (14%), and Energy (13%). The remaining sectors (Health Care, Information 
Technology, Consumer Staples, Telecommunication Services and Utilities) each contribute 
less than the 10% to the sample. On average, CGQ is highest in Consumer Staples and lowest 
in Utilities. The average CGQ of Consumer Staples, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary and 
Health Care is higher than the sample average. However, the average CGQ of Energy, 
Materials, and Utilities is lower than the sample average. In terms of liquidity, different 
sectors perform differently. For instance, TWQS is lowest in Consumer Staples and is highest 
in Information Technology, whereas ILLIQ is lowest in Industrials and is highest in 
Telecommunication. This suggests that relying on single liquidity proxy or dimension is not 
good enough. In the last row, it is possible to observe the results of the Kruskal–Wallis test, 
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which evidences significant differences in the variables by industry. In this sense, it is 
necessary to include industry dummies in the model. 
[Insert Table 3(a) here] 
4.6.2. Time-wise CGQ and liquidity 
Table 3(b) reports the cross-sectional average of CGQ and stock liquidity across years. CGQ 
increased from 6.133 in 2001 to 10.377 in 2013. For stock liquidity, we find a significant 
improvement from 2003 to 2007 following ASX CG reforms. We also observe a detreating 
stock liquidity during 2008 and 2009—the GFC. In the last row, it is possible to observe the 
results of the Kruskal–Wallis test, which evidences significant differences in the variables by 
year. In this sense, it is necessary to include year dummies in the model. 
[Insert Table 3(b) here] 
4.6.3. CGQ wise liquidity 
We provide further insight by comparing stock liquidity across four quartiles of CGQ. The 
Q1 represent firms with lowest CGQ, and Q4 represent firms with highest CGQ. As can be 
seen in Table 3(c), TWQS, ZERO, ILLIQ, and LM decrease when we move from Q1 (low 
CGQ) to Q4 (High CGQ), implying that stock liquidity improves with an improvement in 
CGQ. On the other hand, when we move from Q1 to Q4, TURNOVER, LR, TRADES, 
LEVELS and VOL increase, suggesting an improvement in the CGQ improves stock 
liquidity. 
[Insert Table 3(c) here] 
4.7. Correlation analysis 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation between the variables used in the analysis. In terms of 
the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity, as anticipated, CGQ have a significant 
negative correlation with TWQS, ZERO, Amihud ILLIQ, and LM, whereas CGQ has a 
statistically positive correlation with liquidity ratio (LR), stock turnover (TURNOVER), 
number of trades, number of levels and volume. These results suggest that stock liquidity is 
better in high CGQ firms. However, the correlation results here should be viewed with 
caution, because they do not control the other factors that affect stock liquidity. We also 
observe a significant correlation among alternative proxies of stock liquidity (TWQS and 
ZERO; ILLIQ and LR; TURNOVER, LM, TADES, LEVELS, and VOL).  
Additionally, CGQ is positively correlated with firm size (ln (MC)), leverage (LEV), 
asset tangibility (TANGIBILITY), and firm age (ln (AGE)), indicating that better governed 
firms are larger and older, and have more asset tangibility and high debt in their capital 
structure. On the contrary, CGQ has a negative correlation with inverse of stock price 
(PRICE), stock volatility (VOLATILITY), and growth opportunities (MTB), implying that 
better governed firms are associated with lower equity risk and lower growth opportunities. 
Table 4 also indicates that collinearity is generally moderate between the explanatory 
variables. More specifically, the highest correlation coefficient is between Ln (MC) and 
PRICE of -0.60 (p < 0.01). Finally, we also compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) when 
estimating our regression models to test for signs of multi-collinearity between the 
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explanatory variables. Our untabulated results confirm that no VIFs exceed five for any of 
our explanatory variables, so multi-collinearity is not problematic in this study. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.8. Independent sample t-test 
We further conduct a univariate analysis by means of independent sample t-test. Stock 
liquidity is an elusive concept and is influenced by various variables. However, a univariate 
analysis provides a sense of the economic impact of CGQ on stock liquidity. Table 5 shows 
the univariate results where we compare stock liquidity for the high and low CGQ firms. A 
firm is considered to be in the high/low group if it has a score higher/lower than the sample 
median. We observe a significant difference at the 1% level in all the stock liquidity measures 
between the high CGQ firms and the low CGQ firms. Specifically, trading cost (TWQS and 
ZERO) and price impacts of trade (ILLIQ and LR) are significantly lower for the high CGQ 
firms than for the low CGQ firms. However, immediacy or trading frequency (TURNOVER, 
LM, TRADES, LEVLES, and VOL) is higher for the high CGQ firms than for the low CGQ 
firms. These results imply that firms with better CGQ have a greater stock liquidity. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5. Multivariate regression results 
5.1. Pooled OLS regressions 
Table 6 presents the results of pooled OLS estimates of regression Eq. (9), when CG index is 
the proxy of governance quality and either trading cost (TWQS or ZERO), price impact 
(ILLIQ or LR), or immediacy (TURNOVER, LM, TRADES, LEVELS, or VOL) is the 
dimension (proxy) of stock liquidity. The regression Eq. (9) is well-fitted with an adjusted R-
square of 55.5%, 64%, 69.7%, 61%, 28.3%, 53.5%, 71.3%, 57.1%, and 66.8% for TWQS, 
ZERO, ILLIQ, LR, TURNOVER, LM, TRADES, LEVELS, and VOLUME respectively, 
with statistically significant F-statistics. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As anticipated, the coefficient on CG index is negatively significant at the 1% level for 
both the proxies of trading cost in model 1 (TWQS) and in model 2 (ZERO). This suggests 
that CGQ is inversely linked with the trading cost dimension of stock liquidity. On the other 
hand, as predicted, the coefficient on CG index is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level in model 3 (Amihud ILLIQ estimate), and is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level in model 4 (LR). These results indicate that CGQ is inversely related to the price 
impact dimension of the liquidity. As expected, the CG index has a strong negative influence 
on the LM (model 6) and a strong positive influence on the TURNOVER (model 5), the 
TRADES (model 7), the LEVELS (model 8), and the VOLUME (model 9). These findings 
indicate that CGQ can improve the immediacy dimension of stock liquidity. Overall, these 
results provide support to the notion that better CGQ improves three dimensions of stock 
liquidity. Unlike existing literature on CGQ and stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010; Prommin 
et al., 2014), we show that the improvement in liquidity through governance quality is not 
restricted to one or two dimensions, but is related to all three main dimensions; namely, the 
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trading cost, price impact, and trading frequency. In addition, we document that the 
relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity is unaffected by the use of high frequency or 
low frequency liquidity proxies, and is also unaffected by the use of price-, volume- or quote- 
based liquidity proxies. Therefore, we accept H1a and H1b. 
The economic significance of these results is also important. For instance, an increase in 
the CGQ by one (sample) standard deviation would increase the stock liquidity by 13.12% 
relative to the mean as measured by TWQS (trading cost).16 Likewise, Amihud’s illiquidity 
(price impact) and LM (trading frequency) improves by 1.83% and 19.71% respectively in 
response to an increase in CGQ by one (sample) standard deviation.  
5.2. Alternative estimation methods 
In this section we separately investigate the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the 
relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity. 
5.2.1. Fixed effect (time-series variation) 
In this section, we check the robustness of our results with respect to panel data estimation 
methods. In particular, we analyse the relation between CGQ and stock liquidity using fixed 
effects regression method which controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to time-unvarying 
omitted variables that differ across firms but are constant over time. While estimating the 
effects of independent variables on dependent variables, this method focuses on over time 
changes in the variables. Since fixed-effects regression method focuses on the time-series 
variation between CGQ and stock liquidity, and a causal relation between them can be 
examined using their time-series covariation, this method provide an additional insight into 
the empirical linkage between CGQ and the three dimensions of stock liquidity. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 presents the results of fixed effect estimates of regression Eq. (9), when CG 
index is the proxy of CGQ and either trading cost (TWQS or ZERO), price impact (ILLIQ or 
LR), or immediacy (TURNOVER, LM, TRADES, LEVELS, or VOL) is the dimension 
(proxy) of stock liquidity. The regression Eq. (9) is well-fitted with a reasonable adjusted R-
square and statistically significant F-statistics. We find again that trading cost (TWQS and 
ZERO) and price impact (ILLIQ and LR) are negatively and significantly related to CGQ, 
while trading frequency (TURNOVER, LM, TRADES, LEVELS, VOLUME) is positively 
and significantly related to CGQ. These results provide further support that stock liquidity 
improves with better corporate governance. The existing literature on CGQ and stock 
liquidity (Chung et al., 2010; Prommin et al., 2014) employ fixed-effect regression in the 
short time-series (n=4).  However, FE may not be suitable for relatively short time-series 
(Baltagi, 2005: p 13). Our FE estimates based on a relatively long time-series (n=13) provide 
an additional support to the governance-liquidity linkage. 
5.2.2. Between estimators (cross-sectional variation) 
                                                          
16 We multiply standard deviation of CG index, which is 4.541, with the coefficient on CG index, which is -0.00156, and get -0.00708. 
Therefore, an increase in the CG index by one standard deviation decreases TWQS by -0.00708. As the mean TWQS is 0.054, a decrease by 
-0.00708 denotes a change by -13.12% of the mean. 
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To gain a further insight, we separately investigate the cross-sectional variation through the 
between-estimator regressions. The results reported in Table 8 again confirm that the CGQ is 
linked to stock liquidity cross-sectionally, as well. These results are in contrast to Prommin et 
al. (2014) as they do not find significant linkage between CGQ and stock liquidity in a cross-
sectional setting. We argue that their sample is based on 100 large Thai firms and most of the 
large firms may have similar corporate governance and similar firm characteristics and thus 
may not produce cross-sectional variation in stock liquidity. Our BE estimates, based on a 
relatively large cross-section (i=1,207 firms), provide an additional support to the 
governance-liquidity linkage. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
5.3. Potential endogeneity 
Our analysis so far identifies the strong relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity. The 
causal nature of this relationship, however, is not clear. It is possible that CGQ and stock 
liquidity are determined endogenously, i.e., not only that CGQ may impact stock liquidity, 
but also that stock liquidity may simultaneously trigger changes in CGQ (see e.g., Li et al., 
2012; Wintoki et al., 2012). We use three ways to address this potential endogeneity concern: 
lagged independent variables, the two-stage least square (2SLS) approach, and the two-step 
system GMM, a dynamic panel data estimation technique. 
5.3.1 Lagged independent variables 
Regressions based on contemporaneous variables are susceptible to endogeneity bias due to 
reverse causality, whereas regression based on lagged values of variables help to control for 
reverse causality, and thus tend to be less susceptible to endogeneity effects. We re-estimate 
Eq. (9) by using the current period’s values of the stock liquidity variables (i.e., year t) and 
the prior period’s CGQ and control variables (i.e., year t-1, year t-2 and year t-3). The results 
are reported in Table 9. The new estimated results are virtually indistinguishable from those 
of the original model’s OLS estimate in Table 6. The regression Equation 9 is well-fitted, 
with an adjusted R-square of 55.00%, 61.80%, 69.70%, 61.50%, 26.10%, 50.40%, 68.70%, 
58.10%, and 64.30% for TWQS or ZERO, ILLIQ, LR, TURNOVER, LM, TRADES, 
LEVELS, and VOLUME  respectively, with statistically significant F-statistics. 
There is a significant negative relation of CGQ with trading cost and price impact, and a 
significant positive relation with trading frequency at lag 1, lag 2 and lag 3 specifications.17 
From these results, we conclude that the evidence supports the interpretation that past CGQ 
influences current stock liquidity rather than past stock liquidity influences current choice of 
CGQ. These results not only provide an additional support to our principal results but also 
suggest that CGQ has an ability to predict stock liquidity: a high level in CGQ “current year” 
leads to a greater stock liquidity “next year”. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.1.2.2. Instrumental variable approach (FE-2SLS) 
                                                          
17 For brevity we do not report the results of lag 2 and lag 3. The results are similar when we take lag values of only CG index. 
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To further address potential endogeneity bias due to reverse causality, we use the fixed effect 
two-stage least square (FE-2SLS) approach. Implementation of this approach is far from 
straightforward as it requires the selection of instrumental variables that are not only highly 
correlated with the endogenous variable but also uncorrelated with the error term (Kennedy, 
2003, p. 159). This suggests that we need to identify an instrumental variable that is highly 
correlated with CGQ, but that does not affect stock liquidity except through CGQ.  
We identify CG reform as an instrumental variable for CGQ. We construct a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for the years after the CG reforms (2003) and to 0 otherwise and use it as 
our instrument. We assume that the firm-level CGQ should be higher in the post-CG reforms 
period (2004 to 2013) than that of pre-CG reforms period (2001 to 2003).18 This suggests that 
CG reforms should be highly correlated with the firm-level CGQ. However, there is no 
reason to assume that the CG reforms have a direct relationship with firm-level stock 
liquidity. Therefore, CG reform dummy should function as a valid instrument because it is 
related to firm-level CGQ and yet unlikely to be related to firm-level stock liquidity. This 
approach of using a CG reforms dummy has been employed by Prommin et al. (2014).  
The 2SLS results of Eq. (9) are reported in Panel A of Table 10. The first-stage 
regression results reveal that the coefficient on CG reform is statistically significant and 
positive, implying that CG reform explains firm-level CGQ significantly. In the second-stage 
regression, either trading cost (TWQS or ZERO), price impact (ILLIQ or LR) or immediacy 
(TURNOVER or LM) is the dependent variable. The coefficient on the predicted CGQ is 
statistically significant and positive, confirming our earlier findings, i.e., better CGQ 
improves stock liquidity. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
5.1.2.3. Dynamic panel data estimation 
We further check the robustness of our results by employing the dynamic panel data 
estimation technique. Panel B of Table 10 reports the estimation results of Eq. (9) using the 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic two-step system GMM. 
In the dynamic system GMM, first-differenced variables are used as instruments for the 
equations in levels and the estimates are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, reverse 
causality, and dynamic endogeneity (if any).19 
The consistency of GMM estimation depends on the two important conditions. The first 
condition is the serial independence of the residuals. The residuals in the first difference 
should be serially correlated (AR1) by way of construction but the residuals in the second 
difference should not be serially correlated (AR2). The second condition is the validity of 
instruments, which is tested through Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The 
Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity. The diagnostics tests in Panel B of Table 10 show that models 1–6 are well-fitted 
with statistically insignificant test statistics for second-order autocorrelation in second 
                                                          
18 We check the validity of this assumption by testing whether the CGQ is higher in the post-CG reforms period. The t-test confirms that 
CGQ is indeed higher after the reforms, meaning that there is a significant improvement in CGQ. 
19Please see Roodman (2009) for detailed estimation procedure of dynamic panel data using ‘xtabond2’. 
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differences (AR2) and for Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. Finally, the 
number of instruments (i.e., 22) used in the model is less than the panel (i.e., 1155), which 
makes the Hansen J-statistics more reliable. 
The interpretation of the coefficients on the CG index in Table 10 qualitatively remains 
the same as in Table 6. For instance, the statistically significant negative coefficients on the 
CG index for TWQS, ZERO, ILLIQ and LM suggest that better governance is related to 
greater stock liquidity. Likewise, the statistically significant positive coefficients on the CG 
index for LR and Turnover suggest that governance quality positively relates to stock 
liquidity. Overall, the system GMM estimates in Panel B of Table 10 support the notion that 
even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity, 
better governance is associated with stock liquidity in a way that is consistent with the 
expectation. 
We acknowledge that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate endogeneity 
completely. However, our various tests, based on lagged variables, 2SLS analysis, and 
dynamic system GMM should provide a certain degree of comfort that even when 
endogeneity due to reverse-causality is considered, our main findings regarding CGQ to stock 
liquidity do not change. 
5.4. Alternative sample specifications 
To preclude the possibility that data from the GFC period affects our results, we further check 
the sensitivity of the results by excluding GFC observations (2008 and 2009) from the 
dataset. The untabulated results show that CGQ significantly improves stock liquidity, 
suggesting that the data from GFC period do not alter such a relationship.20  
We further check the robustness of the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity by 
creating a strictly balanced dataset. The strictly balanced dataset (3900 observations) contains 
firms that are available throughout the sample period (n=13). It is evident from the results 
(not tabulated) that the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity survives. These results 
suggest that the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity is not driven by an unbalanced 
part of the sample.21 
We further investigate the sensitivity of our results to potential firm-size effects. For this 
purpose, we re-estimate the regressions using two subsamples, from which either the largest 
10 percent or the smallest 10 percent of the firms has been excluded. The estimation results 
(not tabulated) for the subsample without the smallest or the largest firms are similar to the 
results reported in Table 6. This suggests that our findings are neither altered by relatively 
small firms nor by relatively large firms.22 
5.5. Governance categories and stock liquidity 
The empirical evidence so far demonstrates a robust positive association between CGQ and 
stock liquidity. Our CG index is based on four governance categories; namely, (1) board 
                                                          
20 Further to this, we separately investigate the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity by considering only the GFC period 
observations. The untabulated results reveal that even during the GFC the better governed firms have greater stock liquidity. 
21 The results are similar when we analyse the relation by excluding the firms with one observation from our sample. 
22 The results between CGQ and stock liquidity survive when we consider the top 500 firms only. 
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structure, (2) audit committee, (3) remuneration committee, and (4) nomination committee. In 
this section, we aim to understand which specific CGQ categories derive the results. Since 
some of the CGQ categories are correlated, we run separate regressions for each category to 
avoid multicollinearity problems. The fixed effect regression results are reported in Table 11. 
As can be seen, all the governance categories are significantly related to the three dimensions 
(trading cost, price impact, and immediacy) of stock liquidity. However, it might be noted 
that there is a large coefficient on board quality than those of the other three categories. This 
is consistent with the notion that board quality (proportion of independent directors, CEO 
duality, and board meetings) is directly related to management control and thus prevents them 
from distorting information. Overall, the evidence suggests the relationship between CGQ 
and stock liquidity is not driven by a few governance categories. Therefore, we accept H1c 
and H1d.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
In addition to the governance categories, we also investigate the relationship between 
individual governance variables and stock liquidity. To do so, we first omit the highly 
correlated variables from each governance category and we then run separate fixed-effect 
regressions for the individual variables of board, audit, remuneration, and nomination. The 
results are reported in Table 12. We find that two of the board quality variables (proportion of 
independent directors, and number of board meetings) significantly reduce liquidity risk. 
Further to this, the presence and quality (independence, size, and meetings) of an audit 
committee significantly increases stock liquidity. The presence and quality (independence) of 
nomination and remunerations committee also improve stock liquidity. Although we find 
significant relation between individual governance variables and stock liquidity, such a 
relationship appears to be a little sensitive to the choice of liquidity proxy.  
 [Insert Table 12 here] 
5.6. CGQ, ownership concentration and stock liquidity 
We further check the robustness of our results by including ownership concentration in the 
model. Ownership concentration may be related to stock liquidity. Since large shareholders 
have an incentive to monitor the operations of the firms, they have access to private, value-
relevant information and may trade on this information to extract private benefits, and thus 
increase adverse selection costs and reduce stock liquidity (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). High 
ownership concentration is inversely related to trading volume and continuity of order flow 
because large shareholders trade with lower frequency, which leads to wider spreads and 
lower depth (Kothare, 1997). Therefore, ownership concentration should be negatively 
related to stock liquidity. Further to this, ownership concentration may be related to internal 
governance practices. Since ownership concentration permits close monitoring of a firm’s 
management, it may reduce the demand for alternative monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
proportion of independent directors and separation of CEO from board chair). Consistent 
with this argument, Monem (2013) finds that high ownership concentration decreases board 
independence and increases CEO duality. Given these evidences, it is interesting to include 
ownership concentration variables in the model and examine if the CGQ and stock liquidity 
survives in the presence of ownership concentration. 
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We consider four proxies of ownership concentration; namely, the percentage of shares 
held by the top twenty shareholders (Top 20), by substantial shareholders (block), by chief 
executive officer (CEO), and the presence of directors with substantial shareholdings 
(Directors). Based on these four variables, we construct an ownership concentration index 
(OC index). We assign 1 if the Top 20, block and CEO shareholdings are higher than the 
sample median and 0 otherwise and we assign 1 if one or more of the directors is the 
substantial shareholders of the firm and 0 otherwise. We collect this data from SIRCA. The 
results are presented in Table 13.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
As expected and shown in Table 13, the OC index has a significant negative influence on 
stock liquidity. Specifically, we find high ownership concentration is associated with higher 
trading cost, higher price impact of trade, and low trading frequency. Importantly, the 
coefficients on CGQ remain significant even after controlling for ownership concentration. 
This again confirms the robustness of our results on the relationships between CGQ and the 
three dimensions of stock liquidity. 
6. Conclusion 
Investigating whether CGQ is related to stock liquidity is important for investors and firms. 
As far as could be ascertained, this is the first study to show that the composite CGQ score is 
relevant to the three dimensions of stock liquidity in Australia. Australia provides an 
interesting context in which to examine the governance–liquidity relationship for several 
reasons, including its pure order-driven trading system, less stringent CG environment, low 
litigation risk, relatively weak market for corporate control, and high ownership 
concentration. 
We contribute to the literature by providing comprehensive and updated evidence on the 
linkage between governance quality and stock liquidity. We use the self-constructed CG 
indexes to measure governance quality, and nine alternative proxies of stock liquidity based 
on price, volume, and quote data. This is the first study to cover all three dimensions of 
liquidity, i.e., trading cost (time-weighted quoted spread and zero return measure), price 
impact of trade (Amihud illiquidity estimate and liquidity ratio), and immediacy (turnover, 
turnover adjusted zero volume days, number of trades and levels, and trading volume). We 
use large cross-sectional data (1,207 firms) over the period from 2001 to 2013 and find that 
better governance improves stock liquidity not only within firms, but also between firms. 
These findings are robust to different dimensions of stock liquidity, to alternative estimation 
methods (pooled OLS, FE, and BE), to the different sample specifications (GFC period, 
balanced data, and size effect), and to endogeneity bias. Further, even when we control 
ownership concentration, the governance quality significantly improves stock liquidity.  
The overall findings suggest that governance quality is an important determinant of stock 
liquidity (see Appendix C: Summary of results). Given such a finding, one of the important 
practical implications of our results is that investors, firms, and regulators may wish to 
monitor governance mechanisms more closely in order to devise sound trading strategies, 
corporate environments and trading regulations, respectively.  
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
Notations Variable names Measures 
Panel A: Dependent variables (Stock liquidity) 
 
Trading cost measures(tightness) 
TWQS Time-weighted quoted 
spread 
Daily ratio of time-weighted bid-ask spread divided by time-weighted mid-point 
spread averaged over a number of trading days in the financial year. 
ZERO Zero return measure Proportion of zero daily returns over a number of trading days in the financial 
year. 
 
Price impact measures (depth) 
ILLIQ Amihud illiquidity estimate Daily ratio of absolute stock return to trading volume in Australian dollars 
averaged over a number of trading days in the financial year. 
LR Liquidity ratio Sum of daily trading volume to the sum of absolute stock return in a financial 
year. 
 
Trading frequency measures(immediacy) 
TURNOVER Stock turnover Sum of daily shares traded to the number of shares outstanding in the financial 
year. 
LM Turnover-adjusted zero 
daily volumes 
Turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes. 
TRADES Number of trades Average of number of transactions during the year. 
LEVELS Number of levels Average of number of levels during the year. 
VOLUME Trading volume Total number of shares traded during the year 
   
Panel B: Main independent variable (Corporate governance quality)   
CG index Corporate governance index Self-constructed corporate governance index based on 17 objective criteria of the 
Horwath report. 
Governance categories   
Board quality Board quality index  Board quality is a self-constructed board quality index based on respective 
criteria, which ranges from 0 to 3 
Audit quality Audit quality index Audit quality is a self-constructed audit quality index based on respective criteria, 
which ranges from 0 to 6 
Nomination quality Nomination quality index Nomination quality is a self-constructed governance category based on respective 
criteria, which ranges from 0 to 4 
Remuneration index Remuneration quality index Nomination quality is a self-constructed governance category based on respective 
criteria, which ranges from 0 to 4 
 
Panel C: Control variables (Firm characteristics) 
MC Firm size Number of shares outstanding times share price at the end of fiscal year. 
LEV Leverage Book value of total liabilities over book value of total assets. 
VOLATILITY Return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
TANGIBILITY Asset tangibility Net property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
PRICE Stock price Reciprocal or inverse of stock price. 
AGE Firm age Number of year firm is listed on the ASX at the end of each fiscal year. 
MTB Growth opportunities Market value to book value ratio. 
 
Panel D: Fixed effects 
YR Year effect Thirteen individual dummy variables which equals either “1” or “0” for each year 
from 2001 to 2013 with 2001 being the excluded year. 
IND Industry effect Nine individual dummy variables which equals either “1” or “0” for each 
industry from Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology, 
Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Energy, Utility, 
Telecommunication Services with Telecommunication Services being excluded. 
The industry classification is based on Standard & Poor’s two-digit Global 
Industry Classification Scheme (GICS). 
26 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Min Max Std. dev. 1st Quartile  Median 3rd Quartile 
Panel A:Corporate governance quality         
CG index 10179 8.456 1 17 4.541 5 9 12 
         
Panel B: Stock liquidity 
        TWQS 10179 0.054 0.002 0.222 0.059 0.012 0.031 0.072 
ZERO 10179 0.401 0.051 0.952 0.281 0.162 0.328 0.610 
ILLIQ 10179 7.804 0.002 61.274 15.203 0.134 1.365 6.686 
LR 10179 32.49 0.959 205.84 53.100 3.480 9.598 30.656 
TURNOVER 10179 0.478 0.023 1.596 0.440 0.141 0.324 0.686 
LM 10179 4.077 2.70E-07 18.600 5.643 0.198 0.984 6.175 
# TRADES 10179 148.69 0.484 1222.60 320.15 3.672 14.961 80.893 
ln (TRADES) 10179 2.920 -0.725 7.109 2.175 1.301 2.705 4.393 
# LEVELS 10179 18.772 4.395 49.579 12.314 9.494 15.516 24.391 
ln(LEVELS) 10179 2.721 1.481 3.904 0.663 2.251 2.742 3.194 
ln(VOL) 10179 17.666 14.167 20.780 1.821 16.405 17.713 19.011 
         
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
        Market Capitalization (A$ million) 10179 1,000 9E+04 2E+11 8E+09 2E+07 7E+07 3E+08 
Ln(MC) 10179 18.118 14.996 21.864 1.944 16.588 17.990 19.481 
LEV (%) 10179 0.355 0.021 0.812 0.240 0.130 0.353 0.538 
VOLATILITY 10179 0.038 0.012 0.076 0.019 0.022 0.035 0.051 
TANGIBILITY 10179 0.220 0.002 0.711 0.225 0.027 0.125 0.376 
PRICE 10179 8.406 0.109 50.000 13.641 0.513 2.174 8.333 
AGE (in years) 10179 13.731 1.307 39.866 10.460 5.521 11.167 19.408 
ln(AGE) 10179 2.271 0.268 3.686 0.918 1.708 2.413 2.966 
MTB 10179 2.479 0.22 9.19 2.294 0.9 1.68 3.14 





 Table 3(a): Sample distribution, and industry-wise CGQ and stock liquidity 
   CGQ  Stock liquidity 
     Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
GICS N % CG index  TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM # TRADES Ln(TRADE) # LEVELS Ln(LEVELS) Ln(VOL) 
Materials 3304 32% 7.031  0.059 0.401  7.159 28.732  0.549 3.890 148.236 2.966 19.192 2.760 18.027 
Industrials 1637 16% 9.962  0.046 0.410  4.414 52.213  0.404 4.541 159.256 2.829 17.225 2.616 17.168 
Consumer Discretionary 1431 14% 9.545  0.056 0.446  7.129 45.399  0.376 5.243 158.477 2.635 16.607 2.555 17.093 
Energy 1293 13% 7.367  0.050 0.355  8.181 23.566  0.643 2.962 166.221 3.381 22.214 2.925 18.501 
Health Care 897 9% 9.358  0.045 0.344  5.339 25.314  0.446 2.823 126.866 3.037 19.967 2.829 17.503 
Information Technology 765 8% 8.616  0.067 0.460  10.132 17.696  0.366 5.127 63.398 2.307 15.955 2.586 17.162 
Consumer Staples 454 4% 10.471  0.041 0.392  9.256 35.012  0.419 4.560 233.698 3.137 20.387 2.726 17.290 
Telecommunication 213 2% 9.878  0.056 0.393  10.339 43.368  0.387 3.466 156.499 3.089 20.204 2.823 18.001 
Utilities 139 1% 6.993  0.055 0.398  9.213 40.170  0.364 3.909 120.239 3.175 18.180 2.736 18.002 
Total 10179 
 
8.456  0.054 0.401  7.804 32.490  0.478 4.077 148.692 2.920 18.772 2.721 17.666 
Kruskal–Wallis  796.963  265.005 118.619  294.041 430.656  467.806 122.491 174.562 174.562 327.373 327.373 811.311 
This table presents the cross sectional average of CGQ and liquidity variables across various industrial sectors. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
Table 3(b): Year-wise CGQ and stock liquidity 
 CGQ  Stock liquidity 
   Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
Years CG Index  TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM # TRADES Ln(TRADE) # LEVELS Ln(LEVELS) Ln(VOL) 
2001 6.133  0.061 0.455  9.135 14.255  0.345 4.796 37.215 2.094 16.313 2.599 16.877 
2002 6.278  0.070 0.475  11.283 16.769  0.366 5.289 39.953 2.065 15.418 2.540 17.000 
2003 6.985  0.073 0.525  10.578 18.722  0.314 6.237 38.540 1.831 14.226 2.454 16.902 
2004 7.961  0.049 0.414  8.045 29.594  0.516 3.798 49.581 2.537 16.805 2.656 17.550 
2005 8.242  0.046 0.396  6.074 31.016  0.505 3.569 61.348 2.639 18.134 2.727 17.617 
2006 8.481  0.043 0.367  5.562 33.824  0.537 3.296 87.367 2.859 19.272 2.782 17.756 
2007 8.627  0.039 0.341  4.755 37.424  0.568 2.950 126.458 3.203 19.908 2.809 17.941 
2008 8.668  0.048 0.331  5.688 32.149  0.527 3.209 196.031 3.325 20.999 2.837 17.900 
2009 9.095  0.080 0.423  11.042 24.312  0.424 5.237 201.622 2.914 17.947 2.636 17.645 
2010 9.470  0.050 0.357  7.739 44.882  0.557 3.512 250.119 3.577 21.757 2.858 18.136 
2011 9.834  0.042 0.358  6.267 51.899  0.565 3.378 282.678 3.774 22.100 2.883 18.249 
2012 10.265  0.048 0.382  8.024 44.353  0.487 3.847 292.610 3.608 20.611 2.795 18.046 
2013 10.377  0.049 0.402  7.888 46.764  0.483 4.095 323.830 3.724 20.947 2.807 18.113 
Total 8.456  0.054 0.401  7.804 32.490  0.478 4.077 148.692 2.920 18.772 2.721 17.666 
Kruskal–Wallis 884.18***  483.63*** 406.36***  415.78*** 864.13***  346.34*** 276.42*** 784.09*** 784.09*** 383.64*** 383.64*** 639.55*** 
This table shows the cross sectional average of CGQ and liquidity variables across years. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
Table 3(c): Liquidity in different quantiles of CGQ 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
CGQ quantiles TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM # TRADES ln(TRADES) # LEVELS Ln (LEVELS) ln(VOL) 
Q1 0.091 0.557  13.911 19.883  0.426 6.706 21.010 1.714 13.603 2.443 17.291 
Q2 0.055 0.437  7.606 21.584  0.408 4.475 71.342 2.466 16.351 2.610 17.332 
Q3 0.038 0.335  5.255 32.035  0.471 2.897 162.075 3.319 20.098 2.817 17.771 
Q4 0.019 0.222  2.800 62.438  0.638 1.372 393.495 4.636 27.079 3.123 18.464 
Total 0.054 0.401  7.804 32.490  0.478 4.077 148.692 2.920 18.772 2.721 17.666 
This table shows the comparison of stock liquidity across four quartiles of CGQ. Q1 contains weak CGQ firms, whereas Q4 represents strong CGQ firms.   
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Table 4: Correlation analysis 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 CG index 1.00 
                2 TWQS -0.46 1.00 
               3 ZERO -0.45 0.85 1.00 
              4 ILLIQ -0.28 0.47 0.41 1.00 
             5 LR 0.29 -0.31 -0.40 -0.20 1.00 
            6 TURNOVER 0.17 -0.38 -0.52 -0.19 0.63 1.00 
           7 LM -0.36 0.86 0.93 0.31 -0.33 -0.48 1.00 
          8 ln (TRADES) 0.50 -0.75 -0.90 -0.38 0.62 0.66 -0.79 1.00 
         9 ln(LEVELS) 0.38 -0.71 -0.88 -0.31 0.58 0.68 -0.81 0.91 1.00 
        10 ln(VOL) 0.24 -0.51 -0.66 -0.17 0.70 0.76 -0.68 0.78 0.80 1.00 
       11 Ln(MC) 0.59 -0.69 -0.71 -0.46 0.48 0.30 -0.56 0.76 0.60 0.42 1.00 
      12 LEV 0.28 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.19 1.00 
     13 VOLATILITY -0.37 0.24 0.06 0.41 -0.11 0.17 -0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.24 -0.48 -0.29 1.00 
    14 TANGIBILITY 0.23 -0.18 -0.13 -0.18 0.18 0.04 -0.07 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.32 0.31 -0.29 1.00 
   15 PRICE -0.38 0.48 0.38 0.44 -0.02 -0.05 0.26 -0.33 -0.16 0.09 -0.60 -0.11 0.49 -0.21 1.00 
  16 ln(AGE) 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.13 1.00 
 17 MTB -0.04 -0.13 -0.19 -0.06 0.02 0.12 -0.17 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 1.00 




Table 5: Stock Liquidity in High/low CGQ firms 
 Trading cost 
 Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
Variables TWQS ZERO 
 ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM ln (TRADES) ln(LEVELS) ln(VOL) 
High CGQ 0.028 0.275 
 3.947 48.233  0.56 2.085 4.021 2.98 18.14 
Low CGQ 0.073 0.495 
 10.678 20.755  0.416 5.562 2.100 2.529 17.312 
Difference -0.044*** -0.220*** 
 -6.731*** 27.478***  0.143*** -3.477*** 1.922*** 0.451*** 0.828*** 





Table 6: CGQ and stock liquidity (Pooled ordinary least squares) 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Dependent variables TWQS ZERO  AMIHUD LIQUIDITY RATIO  TURNOVER LM TRADES LEVELS VOLUME 
 (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index -0.00156*** -0.00790***  -0.0314*** 0.0150***  0.00800*** -0.177*** 0.0541*** 0.0197*** 0.0320*** 
 (-7.71) (-8.06)  (-3.44) (2.62)  (4.19) (-7.99) (7.50) (7.95) (4.94) 
Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) -0.0205*** -0.121***  -1.082*** 1.012***  0.115*** -2.456*** 1.075*** 0.323*** 1.193*** 
 (-27.02) (-29.07)  (-23.74) (39.75)  (13.25) (-25.08) (33.25) (28.64) (42.09) LEV 0.0228*** 0.0467***  -0.291** 0.0350  0.0243 1.559*** 0.00715 -0.0463 -0.114 
 (5.53) (2.74)  (-2.00) (0.39)  (0.73) (3.76) (0.06) (-1.05) (-1.07) VOLATILITY -0.675*** -5.767***  29.45*** -1.973  9.881*** -139.7*** 37.36*** 14.03*** 33.30*** 
 (-11.05) (-24.90)  (13.33) (-1.41)  (20.89) (-23.50) (22.81) (23.59) (20.90) TANGIBILITY 0.00186 0.0605***  0.0864 -0.143  -0.0446 1.199*** -0.379*** -0.132*** -0.244** 
 (0.49) (3.28)  (0.48) (-1.48)  (-1.27) (2.78) (-2.80) (-2.62) (-2.21) PRICE 0.000561*** -0.00374  0.0727* -0.807***  -0.0138 0.367*** -0.141*** -0.0856*** -0.843*** 
 (7.37) (-0.84)  (1.73) (-29.98)  (-1.59) (3.65) (-4.28) (-7.14) (-27.67) Ln(AGE) 0.00268*** 0.0190***  -0.0591 0.0638***  0.0301*** 0.435*** -0.0263 0.0199* 0.0857*** 
 (3.05) (4.57)  (-1.55) (2.65)  (3.66) (4.75) (-0.89) (1.86) (3.12) MTB 0.00123*** 0.00357**  0.0351*** -0.000182  -0.00203 0.0860*** -0.0304*** -0.00651* -0.00542 
Industry effect (IND) Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect (YR) Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 (3.95) (2.57)  (2.62) (-0.02)  (-0.65) (2.78) (-2.77) (-1.65) (-0.58) Constant 0.416*** 2.693***  19.44*** -17.36***  -2.324*** 50.22*** -18.60*** -3.752*** -6.681*** 
 (29.76) (36.91)  (22.14) (-37.92)  (-15.17) (29.49) (-31.13) (-19.19) (-13.11) Model fits:            
Adj. R2 0.555 0.640  0.697 0.610  0.283 0.535 0.713 0.571 0.668 
F-statistics 110.96*** 247.91***  193.49*** 167.93***  51.15*** 106.71*** 293.27*** 183.90*** 231.01*** 
Observations 10179 10179  10179 10179  10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 
No. of firms 1207 1207  1207 1207  1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 
This table presents the results of pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of Eq. (9). 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (9) 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6) or number of 
trades (TRADES in Model 7) or number of levels (LEVELS in Model 8) or average volume (VOLUME in Model 9). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; Ln (MC) is 
the natural log of market capitalization;  LEV is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets; PRICE is the reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln(AGE) is the natural log of number of years since the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its financial year. YR is a year 
dummy. IND is an industry dummy. α, β, δ, and ∅ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, *   indicate statistical significance at 





Table 7: CGQ and stock liquidity (Fixed effect regression) 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) Dependant variables TWQS ZERO  AMIHUD LIQUIDITY RATIO  TURNOVER LM TRADES LEVELS VOLUME 
 (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) Corporate governance quality 
CG index -0.000855*** -0.00503***  -0.0441*** 0.00552  0.00624*** -0.0870*** 0.0434*** 0.0156*** 0.0191*** 
 (-4.27) (-6.38)  (-5.80) (1.20)  (3.10) (-4.90) (7.64) (7.37) (3.73) Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) -0.0208*** -0.113***  -1.013*** 0.848***  0.0446*** -2.210*** 0.901*** 0.283*** 0.987*** 
 (-26.20) (-27.03)  (-23.10) (35.33)  (3.93) (-22.24) (32.56) (26.78) (37.06) LEV 0.0117*** 0.0178  -0.343*** -0.202**  -0.0143 0.879** 0.00996 0.00700 -0.238*** 
 (2.77) (1.22)  (-2.68) (-2.53)  (-0.44) (2.37) (0.10) (0.20) (-2.68) VOLATILITY -0.304*** -3.564***  30.01*** -4.121***  8.851*** -86.78*** 26.11*** 8.481*** 26.40*** 
 (-6.04) (-20.19)  (18.38) (-4.01)  (21.74) (-18.78) (23.11) (20.20) (24.39) TANGIBILITY -0.00776** -0.00554  -0.319** 0.0262  0.0405 -0.175 0.104 0.0314 0.0803 
 (-2.06) (-0.38)  (-2.08) (0.30)  (1.06) (-0.52) (0.96) (0.79) (0.86) PRICE 0.000341*** -0.00483  0.0743* -0.683***  0.0565*** 0.346*** -0.0476* -0.0693*** -0.674*** 
 (4.73) (-1.24)  (1.95) (-29.94)  (5.23) (3.78) (-1.78) (-6.95) (-26.92) Ln(AGE) -0.00138 -0.00455  0.0297 0.0782*  0.0726*** 0.182 0.138** 0.0411** 0.262*** 
 (-0.79) (-0.59)  (0.39) (1.84)  (4.19) (1.04) (2.27) (1.96) (5.67) MTB 0.00205*** 0.00822***  0.0680*** -0.000388  -0.00414 0.158*** -0.0587*** -0.0223*** -0.0176** 
 (6.67) (7.03)  (6.59) (-0.06)  (-1.42) (5.97) (-7.37) (-7.62) (-2.57) Year effect (YR) Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 0.430*** 2.553***  17.28*** -13.72***  -0.885*** 46.34*** -14.98*** -2.843*** -2.409*** 
 (30.24) (34.85)  (22.41) (-32.61)  (-4.43) (26.09) (-30.94) (-15.25) (-5.19) Model fits:            Adj. R2 0.396 0.477  0.478 0.462  0.179 0.374 0.585 0.409 0.518 F-statistics 97.72*** 172.53***  189.75*** 185.65***  47.68*** 77.85*** 279.93*** 149.84*** 191.42*** 
Observations 10179 10179  10179 10179  10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 No. of firms 1207 1207  1207 1207  1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 
This table presents the results of fixed effects (FE) estimates of Eq. (9). 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (9) 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6) or number of 
trades (TRADES in Model 7) or number of levels (LEVELS in Model 8) or average volume (VOLUME in Model 9). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; Ln (MC) is 
the natural log of market capitalization;  LEV is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets; PRICE is the reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln(AGE) is the natural log of number of years since the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its financial year. YR is a year 
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This table presents the results of between estimator (BE) estimates of Eq. (9). 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (9) 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6) or number of 
trades (TRADES in Model 7) or number of levels (LEVELS in Model 8) or average volume (VOLUME in Model 9). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; Ln (MC) is 
the natural log of market capitalization;  LEV is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets; PRICE is the reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln(AGE) is the natural log of number of years since the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its financial year. α and β are the 
parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, *   indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9: CGQ and stock liquidity (Lagged independent variables) 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) Dependent variables TWQS ZERO  AMIHUD LR  TURNOVER LM TRADES LEVELS VOLUME 
 (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) Corporate governance quality 
CG index -0.00112*** -0.00609***  -0.0186* 0.0154**  0.00759*** -0.144*** 0.0453*** 0.0160*** 0.0296*** 
 (-5.21) (-5.46)  (-1.89) (2.51)  (3.60) (-5.80) (5.48) (5.79) (4.16) Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) -0.0206*** -0.120***  -1.095*** 1.024***  0.152*** -2.472*** 1.084*** 0.328*** 1.208*** 
 (-25.33) (-26.69)  (-22.97) (38.24)  (15.58) (-23.38) (30.43) (27.04) (39.65) LEV 0.0207*** 0.0502**  -0.213 0.191**  0.0333 1.558*** 0.0445 -0.0443 0.0196 
 (4.61) (2.58)  (-1.30) (1.98)  (0.92) (3.33) (0.32) (-0.90) (0.17) VOLATILITY -0.641*** -4.465***  13.41*** 1.114  5.361*** -110.5*** 27.75*** 12.04*** 23.31*** 
 (-10.45) (-17.86)  (5.96) (0.81)  (11.35) (-17.55) (15.65) (19.28) (13.95) TANGIBILITY 0.00237 0.0719***  0.0360 -0.108  -0.0641* 1.437*** -0.437*** -0.151*** -0.311*** 
 (0.61) (3.54)  (0.19) (-1.04)  (-1.67) (3.06) (-2.90) (-2.77) (-2.59) PRICE 0.000574*** -0.00278  -0.0537 -0.825***  -0.0783*** 0.473*** -0.165*** -0.0839*** -0.928*** 
 (7.29) (-0.57)  (-1.22) (-28.98)  (-8.05) (4.37) (-4.48) (-6.42) (-27.97) Ln(AGE) 0.00227** 0.0195***  -0.0666* 0.0453*  0.00513 0.415*** -0.0470 0.0107 -0.0162 
 (2.44) (4.32)  (-1.68) (1.86)  (0.58) (4.20) (-1.45) (0.94) (-0.57) MTB 0.000168 -0.00195  -0.000882 -0.0000870  0.00233 -0.0165 0.00413 0.00759* 0.00915 
 (0.51) (-1.24)  (-0.06) (-0.01)  (0.66) (-0.49) (0.32) (1.71) (0.84) Industry effect (IND) Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year effect (YR) Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 0.422*** 2.632***  6.602*** -17.81***  -2.822*** 49.79*** -18.55*** -3.832*** -6.518*** 
 (28.41) (32.11)  (6.90) (-36.36)  (-16.56) (27.02) (-27.00) (-17.65) (-11.82) Model fits:            Adj. R2 0.550 0.618  0.697 0.615  0.261 0.504 0.687 0.581 0.643 F-statistics 90.34*** 184.01***  167.37*** 159.28***  48.32*** 72.12*** 271.30*** 188.41*** 195.32*** Observations 8781 8781  8781 8781  8781 8781 8781 8781 8781 No. of firms 1154 1154  1154 1154  1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 This table presents the results of pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of Eq. (9) with lagged independent variables (t-1, t-2 and t-3). 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (9) 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6) or number of 
trades (TRADES in Model 7) or number of levels (LEVELS in Model 8) or average volume (VOLUME in Model 9). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; Ln (MC) is 
the natural log of market capitalization;  LEV is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net property, plant and 
equipment to total assets; PRICE is the reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln(AGE) is the natural log of number of years since the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its financial year. YR is a year 
dummy. IND is an industry dummy. α, β, δ, and ∅ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, *   indicate statistical significance at 





Table 10: CGQ and Stock liquidity: Instrumental variable approach and dynamic panel data estimation 
 
Panel A: Fixed effects two stage least square regression 
 
Panel B: Dynamic panel data estimation 
 
First stage  Second stage 
 
Two-step dynamic system GMM 
  Trading cost Price impact Immediacy Trading cost Price impact Immediacy 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Mode 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Mode 4 Model 5 Model 6 
   (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dependent variables 
 
 TWQS ZERO ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM 
 
TWQS ZERO ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM 
CG reforms 1.238***  
             
 
(16.80)  
             Predicted CG index 
 
 -0.00449*** -0.0222*** -0.162*** 0.273*** 0.0955*** -0.590*** 
       
  
 (-5.43) (-6.64) (-5.17) (11.09) (10.07) (-7.65) 
       L.Liquidity 
 
 
       
0.416*** 0.769*** 1.303*** 0.0735 0.199** 0.804*** 
  
 
       




       
-0.000610** -0.00365*** -0.0637*** 0.00848* 0.00664*** -0.0496** 
  
 
       
(-2.18) (-3.37) (-3.64) (1.69) (4.00) (-1.98) 
Firm characteristics        
Ln (MC) 0.892***  -0.0158*** -0.0961*** -0.893*** 0.238*** -0.0170 -1.333*** 
 
-0.0122*** -0.0194 0.348 0.976*** 0.0715*** -0.286 
 
(25.21)  (-16.52) (-24.94) (-24.72) (8.36) (-1.55) (-14.99) 
 
(-6.93) (-1.08) (0.63) (8.62) (4.68) (-0.60) 
LEV 0.738***  0.0156*** 0.0293*** -0.266*** -0.386*** -0.101*** 1.260*** 
 
0.0135*** 0.0467*** 1.313** -0.0490 -0.0332 0.753*** 
 
(4.06)  (6.02) (2.80) (-2.70) (-4.99) (-3.38) (5.20) 
 
(5.54) (6.14) (2.57) (-0.76) (-1.21) (3.52) 
VOLATILITY -1.420  -0.0100 -3.019*** 31.08*** -3.194*** 6.684*** -68.70*** 
 
-0.346*** -3.278*** 14.63** -2.677** 9.256*** -75.16*** 
 
(-0.67)  (-0.34) (-25.49) (28.00) (-3.65) (19.87) (-25.14) 
 
(-9.16) (-14.61) (2.19) (-2.40) (16.78) (-9.09) 
TANGIBILITY 1.629***  -0.00138 0.0266** -0.0982 -0.308*** -0.117*** 0.582** 
 
0.000817 0.00784 0.279 0.00352 0.0328 0.108 
 
(8.23)  (-0.47) (2.22) (-0.88) (-3.49) (-3.44) (2.11) 
 
(0.38) (0.87) (1.40) (0.05) (1.18) (0.47) 
PRICE -0.002  0.000404*** 0.000331* -0.00752*** 0.0289*** -0.00299*** 0.00785* 
 
0.000431*** -0.0312*** -0.0535 -0.785*** 0.0251* -0.611*** 
 
(-0.66)  (9.34) (1.89) (-4.58) (22.39) (-6.01) (1.94) 
 
(8.11) (-4.13) (-0.38) (-8.58) (1.88) (-2.67) 
Ln (AGE) 1.039***  0.0146*** 0.0669*** 0.300*** -0.0993** -0.0805*** 1.739*** 
 
0.00112 -0.00328 -0.0323 0.100*** 0.0231*** -0.0791 
 
(15.02)  (9.31) (10.60) (5.07) (-2.13) (-4.49) (11.94) 
 
(1.50) (-0.75) (-0.90) (4.17) (2.67) (-0.59) 
MTB -0.257***  0.000350 0.00157 0.0361*** 0.0483*** 0.0259*** -0.0220 
 
0.000508 -0.00297** -0.145** -0.00291 -0.00150 0.00228 
 
(-16.99)  (1.20) (1.33) (3.26) (5.54) (7.72) (-0.81) 
 
(1.62) (-2.04) (-2.16) (-0.46) (-0.60) (0.07) 
Industry effect No  No No No No No No 
 
No No No No No No 
Year effect No  No No No No No No 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -10.94***  0.335*** 2.269*** 15.57*** -4.038*** -0.0699 31.27*** 
 
0.259*** 0.590 -6.181 -16.28*** -1.349*** 9.146 
 
(-17.67)  (24.50) (41.08) (30.06) (-9.90) (-0.45) (24.53) 
 




             Adj. R2 28.80  25.80 36.83 44.11 19.57 4.91 16.51 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
F-statistics 453.2***  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
268.2*** 938.8*** 441.7*** 226.8*** 72.71*** 528.4*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A -4.86*** -5.70*** -3.09*** -3.29*** -4.87*** -4.19*** 
          [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  -0.26 -1.37 1.26 -1.58 -1.33 0.17 
          [0.793] [0.170] [0.207] [0.113] [0.183] [0.865] 
Hansen J-statistics  N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  4.15 0.91 0.06 20.50 107.16 1.34 
          [0.126] [0.340] [0.810] [0.058] [0.081] [0.247] 
Observations 10179  10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 
 
8781 8781 8781 8781  8781 
No of instruments N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 22 22 22 22 22 22 
No. of firms 1207  1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 
 
1155 1155 1155 1155 1155 1155 
This table presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and two-step dynamic system GMM of Eq. (9). 




Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, Ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6). CG index is 
self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; Ln (MC) is the natural log of market capitalization;  LEV is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; VOLATILITY is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net property, plant and equipment to total assets; PRICE is the reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln(AGE) is the natural log of number of years since 
the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its financial year. YR is a year dummy. IND is an industry dummy. α,β,δ,and ∅ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. We use robust 
standard errors, incorporating the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction. Instruments are collapsed to reduce IV proliferation and preserve sample depth. Finally, Arellano–Bond AR(1) and AR(2) are the test 
statistics for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen J-statistics is the test of over-identifying restrictions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, *   indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Table 11: Governance categories and stock liquidity (Fixed effect regression) 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) Dependent variables TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ LR  TURNOVER LM TRADES LEVELS VOLUME 
 (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) Panel A            Board quality -0.00286*** -0.0172***  -0.115*** 0.0498**  0.0373*** -0.313*** 0.138*** 0.0504*** 0.104*** 
 (-3.17) (-4.91)  (-3.56) (2.49)  (4.23) (-3.96) (5.89) (5.90) (4.69) Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adj. R2 0.395 0.475  0.475 0.462  0.180 0.373 0.582 0.404 0.519 
            Panel B            Audit quality -0.00186*** -0.00892***  -0.0669*** -0.00117  0.00684** -0.176*** 0.0686*** 0.0263*** 0.0261** 
 (-4.01) (-5.15)  (-4.38) (-0.12)  (2.34) (-4.30) (5.78) (5.97) (2.31) Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adj. R2 0.396 0.475  0.476 0.462  0.066 0.374 0.582 0.406 0.517 
            Panel C            Nomination quality -0.000544* -0.00683***  -0.0932*** 0.0239**  0.0135*** -0.0784** 0.0861*** 0.0284*** 0.0337*** 
 (-1.67) (-4.01)  (-5.41) (2.51)  (3.24) (-2.16) (6.63) (6.08) (3.15) Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adj. R2 0.312 0.473  0.477 0.462  0.178 0.371 0.583 0.405 0.517 
            Panel D            Remuneration quality -0.00127*** -0.00720***  -0.0611*** 0.00183  0.00751 -0.126*** 0.0539*** 0.0195*** 0.0226* 
 (-2.92) (-3.98)  (-3.33) (0.18)  (1.56) (-3.13) (3.90) (3.80) (1.94) Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adj. R2 0.395 0.474  0.475 0.462  0.177 0.372 0.580 0.403 0.517 This table presents the results of fixed effects (FE) estimates of Eq. (9) for governance categories. 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (9) 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6) or number of 
trades (TRADES in Model 7) or number of levels (LEVELS in Model 8) or average volume (VOLUME in Model 9). CGQ is either board quality, audit quality, nomination quality or remuneration quality. Other 










Immediacy or trading frequency 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 






(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 




TURNOVER LM NT NL VOL 
 
(Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) 
Panel A: Board quality variables 
Board independence -0.00542** -0.0376*** -0.388*** 0.170*** 
 






(4.93) (-2.54) (6.62) (6.18) (4.28) 










(-0.16) (1.54) (0.28) (-1.40) (0.29) 






(4.12) (-4.03) (7.02) (5.80) (5.59) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










(-4.84) (25.98) (-31.82) (-16.09) (-5.63) 




0.184 0.375 0.586 0.409 0.521 
Panel B: Audit quality variables 










(1.66) (-2.24) (2.64) (-0.67) (2.26) 






(3.57) (-2.02) (7.01) (7.18) (3.62) 






(2.23) (-5.12) (5.94) (5.41) (4.75) 
AC meetings -0.00253*** -0.0177*** -0.115** 0.000171 
 






(2.91) (-2.71) (5.93) (6.76) (4.16) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










(-4.53) (47.50) (-31.29) (-26.18) (-9.06) 










TO LM NT NL VOL 
Panel C: Nomination quality variables 
NC presence -0.00117 -0.0188*** -0.205*** 0.0453* 
 






(1.95) (-2.52) (5.56) (5.85) (2.95) 










(2.79) (-0.41) (5.05) (3.30) (1.09) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










(-8.42) (48.71) (-51.67) (-27.00) (-9.55) 




0.068 0.287 0.526 0.324 0.452 
Panel D: Remuneration quality variables 
RC presence -0.00405*** -0.0150*** -0.0608 -0.0456* 
 






(-0.31) (-4.13) (0.55) (1.67) (0.42) 






(4.12) (-0.53) (7.43) (3.22) (2.57) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










(-8.49) (47.95) (-51.43) (-15.61) (-5.48) 









Table 13: CGQ, ownership concentration and stock liquidity (Fixed effect regression) 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy or trading frequency 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) Dependent variables TWQS ZERO  AMIHUD LR  TURNOVER LM TRADES LEVELS VOLUME 
 (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm)  (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) (Clustered by firm) Corporate governance variables 
CG index -0.000815*** -0.00478***  -0.0420*** 0.00399  0.00545*** -0.0818*** 0.0416*** 0.0149*** 0.0171*** 
 (-4.10) (-6.18)  (-5.67) (0.89)  (2.82) (-4.69) (7.49) (7.26) (3.47) OC index 0.00359*** 0.0214***  0.176*** -0.132***  -0.0678*** 0.442*** -0.154*** -0.0631*** -0.165*** 
 (6.18) (9.70)  (8.43) (-10.50)  (-12.08) (8.26) (-10.23) (-11.48) (-12.43) Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) -0.0212*** -0.116***  -1.035*** 0.865***  0.0531*** -2.266*** 0.921*** 0.291*** 1.007*** 
 (-26.50) (-27.79)  (-24.18) (36.86)  (4.94) (-22.63) (34.16) (28.57) (39.22) LEV 0.0116*** 0.0175  -0.345*** -0.201**  -0.0134 0.873** 0.0122 0.00790 -0.236*** 
 (2.76) (1.21)  (-2.73) (-2.55)  (-0.43) (2.37) (0.13) (0.23) (-2.70) VOLATILITY -0.288*** -3.458***  30.87*** -4.774***  8.517*** -84.60*** 25.35*** 8.170*** 25.58*** 
 (-5.76) (-19.75)  (18.93) (-4.68)  (21.22) (-18.48) (22.61) (19.67) (23.88) TANGIBILITY -0.00774** -0.00524  -0.317** 0.0243  0.0395 -0.168 0.101 0.0305 0.0780 
 (-2.06) (-0.36)  (-2.11) (0.29)  (1.07) (-0.50) (0.96) (0.79) (0.85) PRICE 0.000335*** -0.00364  0.0847** -0.690***  0.0527*** 0.370*** -0.0562** -0.0728*** -0.683*** 
 (4.66) (-0.94)  (2.29) (-31.16)  (5.16) (4.02) (-2.16) (-7.52) (-28.42) Ln(AGE) -0.000208 0.00264  0.0883 0.0337  0.0497*** 0.330* 0.0862 0.0199 0.206*** 
 (-0.12) (0.35)  (1.17) (0.80)  (2.96) (1.91) (1.42) (0.97) (4.57) MTB 0.00210*** 0.00842***  0.0696*** -0.00162  -0.00477* 0.162*** -0.0601*** -0.0229*** -0.0192*** 
 (6.83) (7.31)  (6.89) (-0.26)  (-1.70) (6.18) (-7.77) (-8.06) (-2.89) Year effect (YR) yes yes  Yes yes  Yes yes yes yes yes Constant 0.427*** 2.546***  3.408*** -13.67***  -0.861*** 46.19*** -14.93*** -2.821*** -2.352*** 
 (30.15) (35.12)  (4.55) (-33.66)  (-4.59) (26.10) (-31.89) (-15.73) (-5.31) Model fits:            Adj. R2 0.402 0.487  0.484 0.474  0.204 0.385 0.594 0.425 0.533 F-statistics            Observations 10179 10179  10179 10179  10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 No. of firms 1207 1207  1207 1207  1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 This table presents the results of fixed effects (FE) estimates of Eq. (9). 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝐶)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸)𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛿 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + ∅ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (9) 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable LIQUIDITY is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in 
Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (LR in Model 4) or trading turnover (TURNOVER in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6) or number of 
trades (TRADES in Model 7) or number of levels (LEVELS in Model 8) or average volume (VOLUME in Model 9). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; OC index 
is based on four variables namely percentage of shares held by TOP20 (above median 1), block holders (above median 1), and CEO (above median 1), and the presence of one or more directors with substantial 
shareholdings;  Ln (MC) is the natural log of market capitalization;  LEV is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net 
property, plant and equipment to total assets; PRICE is the reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln(AGE) is the natural log of number of years since the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its financial 
year. YR is a year dummy. α, β, δ, and ∅ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, *   indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 




Appendix A: Horwath corporate governance report 2008 
1. Board of Directors 
1.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have: 
1.1.1 A board with the majority of independent directors; 
1.1.2 An independent chairperson; and 
1.1.3 Met at least six times annually 
1.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company to have: 
1.2.1 A board with no independent directors 
1.2.2 The CEO as chairperson; and 
1.2.3 Met less than six times annually. 
2. Audit Committee 
2.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have an audit committee: 
2.1.1 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 
2.1.2 With a chair, who is not also the chair of the main board; 
2.1.3 With at least one member with professional or educational accounting qualifications; 
2.1.4 With at least three members; 
2.1.5 That does not comprise the full board; and 
2.1.6 That meets at least four times annually. 
2.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have an audit committee 
3. Remuneration Committee 
3.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have a remuneration committee: 
3.1.1 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 
3.1.2 With at least three members; and 
3.1.3 That does not comprise the full board. 
3.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have a remuneration committee. 
4. Nomination Committee 
4.1 The most desirable outcome will be for a company to have a nomination committee: 
4.1.1 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 
4.1.2 With at least three members; and 
4.1.3 That does not comprise the full board 
4.2 The least desirable outcome will be for a company not to have a nomination committee. 
5. External Auditor Independence 
5.1 Weighting is placed on the proportion of non-audit fees (relative to audit fees) paid by a client to their auditor, and the policy relating 
to the provision of non-audit services. 
6. Code of Conduct and Other Policy Disclosures 
6.1 A weighting is included for the quality of disclosures relating to the existence and substance of a company’s: 
6.1.1 Code of Conduct; 
6.1.2 Policy on risk management; 
6.1.3 Policy on share trading; and 
6.1.4 Clarity of corporate governance disclosures. 
Appendix B: Simplified corporate governance index 
Number Governance categories Present Absent 
1 Board of Directors   
1.1 A board with the majority of independent directors 1 0 
1.2 An independent chairperson; and 1 0 
1.3 Met at least six times annually 1 0 
2 Audit Committee   
1.2 Existence of audit committee 1 0 
2.2 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
2.3 With a chair, who is not also the chair of the main board; 1 0 
2.4 With at least three members; 1 0 
2.5 That does not comprise the full board; and 1 0 
2.6 That meets at least four times annually. 1 0 
3 Remuneration Committee   
3.1 Existence of remuneration committee 1 0 
3.2 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
3.3 With at least three members; and 1 0 
3.4 That does not comprise the full board. 1 0 
4 Nomination Committee   
4.1 Existence of nomination committee 1 0 
4.2 With all the members, including the chair, independent; 1 0 
4.3 With at least three members; and 1 0 
4.4 That does not comprise the full board 1 0 
 
 
Appendix C: Summary of results 
Questions Description Answers 
1 Does governance quality improve stock liquidity in Australia? Yes 
1.1 Are the results robust to alternative dimensions and proxies of stock liquidity? Yes 
1.2 Are the results robust to alternative estimation methods (Pooled OLS, FE, BE)?  Yes 
1.3 Are the results robust to endogeneity bias? Yes 
1.4 Are the results robust to alternative sample specifications (exclusion of GFC period observations, balance dataset and size effect)? Yes 
1.5 Are the results robust to governance categories (board, audit, nomination and remuneration)? Yes 
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